JEAN DANIÉLOU, S.J.

  

 

THE LORD OF HISTORY

 

Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History

 

 

  

Translated by Nigel Abercrombie


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© Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1958

First published in France by Editions du Seuil, Paris under the title "Essai sur le Mystère de l'Histoire"

This edition first published 1958

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY W. & J. MACKAY & CO LTD, CHATHAM. IMPRIMI POTEST J. D. BOYLE, S.J., VICE-PRAEP. PROV. ANGL. SOC. JESU. DATUM LONDINI DIE 28 MAII 1958. NIHIL OBSTAT JOHANNES M. T. BARTON, S.T.D., L.S.S., CENSOR DEPUTATUS. IMPRIMATUR GEORGIUS L. CRAVEN, EPŪS SEBASTOPOLIS, VIC. GEN. WESTMONASTERII, DIE 2A JUNII 1958.
CONTENTS

 

Preface to the English Edition

 

 

Introduction

Part I

 

 

 

I Sacred and Profane History

 

 

II Christianity and Cultures

 

 

III Confusion of Tongues

 

 

IV Exile and Hospitality

 

 

V Marxist and Sacramental History

 

 

VI Temporal Works and the Marxist Myth

 

 

VII A Biblical Interpretation of Modern History

 

 

VIII The History of Religions: and the History of Salvation

 

 

IX Strength and Weakness of René Guénon

 

 

X Symbolism and History

 

 

Part II

 

I Magnalia Dei

 

 

II The Song of the Vine

 

 

III Christology and History

 

 

IV 'Let My People Go'

 

 

V The Banquet of the Poor

 

 

VI The Development of History

 

 

VII Lent and Eastertide

 

 

VIII Notions of Eschatology

 

 

Part III

       I Courage

 

 

II Poverty

 

             III Sincerity

 

 

             IV Zeal

 

 

             V Gnosis

 

 

             VI Hope

 

 

 

 


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are indebted to his Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, and Messrs. Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. for extracts from Mgr. Ronald Knox's version of the Bible.


 

PREFACE

TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

 

HISTORY, like morals, may be considered on either of two distinct levels of intelligibility. The chronicle of past events may be more or less comprehensive and accurate, more or less penetrating and persuasive; at this scientific and critical level, the discipline of history corresponds to the practical discipline of the good life -- it is essentially empirical, as the other is essentially pragmatic. This is the context in which Lord Acton's ideal of a chaste impartiality in historical writing is permanently valid, and Aristotle's dictum (that history is less philosophical than poetry) commands assent. Exactly so in morals -- courage, chastity, kindness are autonomous values; though, at another level of understanding, the eternal worth of these virtues may be seen to depend entirely upon godliness: and the intellectual worth of history proves likewise to depend upon revelation.

It is with history in this latter sense, alone, that Father Daniélou has concerned himself in this book.

In the Introduction, he shows how the bare possibility of history (as distinct from chronicle) arises from the revealed knowledge of God's creative work, and why this particular dimension of thought was discovered late in time.

The next ten chapters investigate a variety of contemporary topics from the point of view of history as a succedaneum of the Christian revelation.

Part II of the book elucidates some of the principles and techniques of history itself, so understood, exhibiting the kind of continuity and the kind of progress to be found in it.

In the last six chapters, the author looks at the present and future course of history, to see in what sense the Christian 'makes' history.

In the preface to the original French edition, Father Daniélou explained that parts of the work had been composed in lecture form: the present translation follows the printed French text closely enough for this remark to have some application still -- it seemed that more would have been lost than gained by any attempt to disguise the book as a treatise.

Quotations of Scripture are taken from the Knox version (or, occasionally, from its footnotes), with two exceptions: biblical material in patristic passages, which is commonly not in verbal agreement with the Vulgate, is given in the form which the context seems to require; and Father Mackey's version of St François de Sales (p. 296 ), including a quotation from St Paul, stands unaltered.

NIGEL ABERCROMBIE

Lewes. Easter 1958.


 

INTRODUCTION

I

THE Bible is a record of the evidence for certain events, certain historical works of God: as, the covenant with Abraham, the birth and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and Pentecost. Consequently the Christian outlook is primarily determined by a series of divine operations, tracing a distinct line of development: each of these events marks a new stage in the actualization of God's design, and a mutation of human life. Two aspects of the whole process are of especial importance: first the nature of the event itself, and of the divine decision transforming reality; and secondly the succession of events, exhibiting at once a certain continuity and a certain discontinuity, i.e. by definition, progress.

If we now examine the forms of thought and philosophical systems current at the time when Christianity first made its appearance in the world, it is clear that they were by no means ready to assimilate this Christian conception: on the contrary, they were wholly antagonistic thereto.

In the first place, there was the influence of Greek thought: here, that which is divine consists in the unmoved eternal order of Ideas. Immutable law, whether of nature or of society, represents to the senses the changeless eternity of the intelligible world. The phenomenon of movement itself is an imitation of immobility, being conceived as cyclical, both in the regular motions of the heavenly bodies and in the eternal recurrence which governs the course of history, so that the same events will be everlastingly repeated. By going round in a circle, even change thus conforms to the stable eternity of the ideal world, and no longer implies innovation. No such thing as an event can ever infringe the eternal order.

The opposition is fundamental between this conception and the Christian belief in a unique, irrevocable value belonging to the historical Incarnation. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, Christ is said to have entered 'once' (παξ) into the holy place, that is, when he ascended into God's heaven: something was then irrevocably gained. Nothing can ever again divide human nature from the Divinity; there is no possibility of a relapse; mankind is essentially saved. All that remains is the business of extending to the individual members of the species that which has been secured for all humanity. The event, then, has finally effected a qualitative change at a given moment in time, so that things can never be the same again. The words 'past' and 'present' have here their full meaning. It is this belief in the irreversibility of salvation that gives rise to the Christian virtue of hope, in contrast to the characteristic melancholy which flows from the Greek acceptance of an endless repetition.

Curiously enough, the earliest Christian theologians were slow to realize the originality of their own position, and in fact began by trying to eliminate it. Thus Origen held that the spiritual creation existed in a state of perfection from the first, and is presumably co-eternal with the Word: [1] but it fell: consequently the purpose of the Incarnation was to restore a pre-existing condition of affairs. There is nothing new in history. It would have been better if nothing happened at all, and everything had remained in its primordial stability. Similarly Eusebius [2] teaches that Christ brought about no innovation of truth, but came simply to re-establish the pure religion of primitive man, for which Judaism had been a temporary substitute. In both these instances, we find the same Greek idea of perfection as something which has always been the same.

In St Augustine City of God, there is a vivid awareness of the Christian conception of history, in all its paradoxical originality. Sacred history is here seen to consist of positive beginnings which subsequently last for ever. The notion is refractory to the normal processes of human understanding, which is accustomed to conceive reality under a two-fold classification: there are things that have neither beginning nor end, which Philo called Θεîα, the things of God, and there are things that have a beginning and an end, namely corruptible material things. The possibility of things that have a beginning but no end is offensive to reason: it seems to derive directly from Christian thought. In the City of God, all the great creative decisions of God which have determined the course of history are seen to be of this kind: the creation of the world (XI: 4), and of mankind (XII: 13), the Covenant with Abraham, which St Augustine called articulus temporis (XVI: 12), and the resurrection of Christ and life eternal, determining the everlasting destiny of man (XII: 21). St Gregory of Nyssa gave expression to the same conception of history when he wrote that 'it proceeds from beginnings to beginnings, by successive beginnings that have no end'.[3]

This example is enough to indicate the method which characterizes the theology of history: it consists precisely in the use of scriptural principles for the resolution of questions to which these principles were not, in scripture, explicitly applied. In the case mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the particular principle to be applied belongs properly to the Covenant: it is this, that God's promises are irrevocable because of his faithfulness; men may be unfaithful, and thus withdraw themselves from the beneficial enjoyment of the promises, but they cannot have the promises withdrawn. So the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, which took place at a given moment in time, is thenceforward permanent, irrespective of all the possible sinfulness of mankind. St Augustine takes over this principle as applicable also to such matters as the creation, or the eternal destiny of man, for these have the same quality of occurring in time (or with time, in the case of the creation of the world), but once for all thereafter.

* * *


II

In conflict with the trend of Greek thought, which may fairly be taken as representative of pure reason, the aspect of the Christian outlook on history that came into prominence was the absolute significance of individual events. In controversy with the representatives of Judaism, a second aspect of the same outlook had to be more precisely formulated: this was the interrelation between those events. There is no such thing as history unless events, besides having some importance, can be shown to be in some way continuous. It is just this latter point which distinguishes the idea of 'historicity', as understood by existentialists, meaning no more than the present decision of an individual free will, from the idea of sacred history, wherein the individual fits into the pattern of a larger and objectively planned arrangement of reality.

Jews and Christians agree in believing that the religious institutions of Jewry, such as the circumcision, the sabbath, and the temple, are of divine origin; but Christians simultaneously hold that Christ abolished these institutions. How is this apparent contradiction to be explained? Can a good thing ever be no good? The problem was insoluble with the intellectual equipment of the ancient thinkers. Consequently we find that the earliest Christian writers such as the pseudo-Barnabas, and Justin, were actually driven to declare that the Jewish forms never were good, on the hypothesis that their only valid significance was always the spiritual sense enshrined in them, while the literal practice of the rites themselves was always wrong. This desperate attempt to dispose of the difficulty plainly undervalued the Old Testament, in the same sort of way as the gnostics who repudiated it altogether.

St Irenaeus was the first to discover and propound without ambiguity the basis of a definitive solution. Here again it was highly offensive to pure reason, for it introduced the notion of time, καíρος, as a necessary element in the formation of value-judgements concerning reality. Thus it must be confessed, on the one hand, that the Old Testament is good, and that it is the work of the same God who made the New Testament. On the other hand the values of the Old Testament were provisional; they are no longer to be prized when once their due season, their καíρος, has elapsed. The error of the Jews is strictly an anachronism, because they would arrest the development of God's plan, and perpetuate an obsolete pattern of reality. Origen, following Melito of Sardis, described the Old Testament as a preliminary sketch -- something indispensable at one stage, but of no further use once the work is finished; [4] or as a lamp, which it is absurd to keep alight after sunrise. [5] The Christian attitude towards the Old Testament is simply the gratitude that a grown man should feel for the education he had as a child. [6]

This, then, is the second distinctive feature of the Christian view of history; the historical process is seen as an economy of progress. The Old and the New Testaments belong to one scheme of things, but mark two successive stages in its development. St Irenaeus explains this design of succession as a system of pedagogy. Everything that belongs to the temporal order must be imperfect at first.[7] God himself consented to this law of original imperfection. Before granting the plenitude of revelation to his people, he began by familiarizing them gradually with his ways, that is, by educating them.[8] 'Thus he called them from what was secondary to what was essential, from types to realities, from temporal things to eternal, from fleshly to spiritual, from earthly to heavenly.' [9]

The mention of 'types', or 'figures', here is of cardinal importance, for the typological method of exegesis defines the relationship of the Old Testament to the New, explaining both the similarities and the differences between them. So the Flood, the resurrection of Christ, and holy baptism all conform to one basic structural type: in all three, there is a judgement of God, importing the destruction of the sinful world, the old man; in each case, the righteous is spared, to be the origin of a new manhood. So again, the crossing of the Red Sea prefigured both the Resurrection, and Baptism, being an exercise of divine power to save the people from the bondage of the powers of evil. In this way, typology gives expression to the specific intelligibility that belongs to history as such. Without it, the events recorded would convey no assimilable meaning to our bewildered comprehension; the key is in the possibility of reference back to earlier manifestations of the same ways. Thus the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary belongs to a series of annunciations, to Sarah, to Hannah, to Zacharias, while at the same time surpassing them all.

* * *

III

Enough has been said to illustrate the essentially historical character of the Christian notion of reality; but there remains a further point: the two categories of event, and progress, do not exhaust the topic. If they did, we should be faced with a theory of indefinite progress, on the model of contemporary theories of evolution. Any such view would leave out of account the further, essential truth, that Christianity is not only progress, but itself the goal of progress. This third and final characteristic of the Christian outlook on history is its eschatological quality; the idea of an end, σχατον, is of capital importance in the system, from three distinct points of view. First, history is not conceived as an indefinite progress, but as finite in scope; it is a determinate, circumscribed design, called by the Fathers of the Church the cosmic week, which is to be followed by the eighth day, representing the life of the world to come. Secondly, Christianity is itself the term of development: Christ professedly comes 'late in time', and inaugurates the stage that will not pass away. So there is nothing beyond Christianity. It is indeed σχατος, novissimus, the last thing. And it is the everlasting juvenescence of the world, which makes everything else obsolete. Thirdly, the end of history has already taken place, because the incarnation and the ascension of Christ fulfil its purpose.

It is the great merit of O. Cullmann's book, Christ and Time, that it gives powerful emphasis to this truth: Christ's resurrection being the decisive event in all history, nothing that can ever happen will equal it in importance. This disposes at once of all the errors of evolutionism. No progress now can ever bring about for us what we have already got in Christ; that which is beyond all progress is here and now in him; the last state exists already in the Christian mysteries. Consequently no identification is permissible between the Christian hope and a belief in progress: they are radically different things. We have said that Christianity gives a metaphysical value to the idea of innovation: but as it now appears that Christ is the ultimate event, he is, in a sense, the culminating and final innovation. It is a further peculiarity of the Christian outlook on history that the centre of interest is neither at the beginning, as it was for the Greeks, nor at the end, as it is in evolutionary theories, but in the middle. It follows that history differs in kind between B.C. and A.D. History before Christ was a preparation and an awaiting. Once he is come, the essential business is to hand on (παρδοσς) the sacred and now immutable trust delivered once and for all. The idea of tradition thus acquires a real meaning, because the world to come is there already.

Granted that the last days have come with Christ's gift of eternal life, a new problem of another sort arises, not now from the impact of Christianity upon other systems of thought, but from the actual historical situation of Christianity itself. If it be said that the coming of Christ has altered the state of mankind, the objection has to be met that, in the world about us, no change is in fact apparent. It is as old as Origen: 'It is obvious in the fall of Jericho (which prefigured the defeat of the Powers by the cross of Christ) that the devil and his army was destroyed. How then is it that these have still so much power against the servants of God? . . . Again, the apostle Paul says that Christ has raised us up in his resurrection, and seated us with himself in heaven -- yet we believers do not seem to be resurrected, or in heaven.' [10] Origen supplies the answer, in the same passage: 'The coming was indeed fulfilled in Christ's abasement, but we hope for another coming in glory. The first was called "shadow" in a mystical text of holy scripture: "Under his shadow we shall live among the heathen." Hence we know that many things are but a shadow in the time of the first coming.' [11] The Church stands in relation to the Second Coming much as the Law stood in relation to the first: 'The Apostle says that the Law is a shadow of good things to come. . . . But we no longer live in their shadow, because we are no longer subject to the Law, . . . we are under a better shadow, for we live under Christ's shadow among the heathen.' [12]

The whole life of the Church is characterized by this constant eschatological reference. Present knowledge 'through a glass, in a dark manner' points towards vision 'face to face'. The visible organization of the Church prefigures the heavenly hierarchy. The sacraments are types and pledges of eternal rewards. Origen says of Baptism that 'in the regeneration through fire and the spirit, we shall be conformed to the body of Christ's glory as he sits on the throne of his majesty'. [13] The holy Eucharist is specifically both the nourishment of wayfarers and an anticipation of the eschatological banquet. The whole Christian position is determined by the expectation of the Second Coming: but there is no knowing just when it will be.

This last question notoriously exercised men's minds a great deal in the earliest Christian times. Their preoccupation with Christ's coming again provoked a variety of speculative suggestions, some based on the 'weeks of years' in Daniel, others on the idea of seven millennia. Hippolytus supposed that Christ was born in the middle of the sixth millennium, so that the Second Coming would be in A.D. 500. [14] St Augustine, in his earlier writings, put the Incarnation at the beginning of the same millennium, giving A.D. 1000 as the date of the Second Coming. But Christ had already warned his first disciples against all such computations; and the demonstrated error of the conclusions shows their absurdity. God keeps the secret of that day and hour of the Second Coming. Nevertheless it is always imminent, and the Christian attitude of mind intrinsically depends upon the expectation of it, just as the Christian outlook on history is defined in terms of it.

* * *

IV

Consideration of the lapse of time before the Second Coming leads us to examine the current history of the Christian Church. St Augustine says that sacred history continues usque ad praesentia tempora. This is a point of importance. Sacred history is not restricted to the contents of the Bible, but is still going on: we are living in sacred history. God still accomplishes his mighty works, in the conversion and sanctification of souls.[15] The particular significance of this point is missed in the usual Protestant presentations of the theology of history, where sacred history tends to be identified with what is recorded in the Scriptures, and no reference is made to the Church as continuing God's work through the infallible magisterium and the unfailing efficacy of the sacraments. On this understanding the age of the New Israel is less happily circumstanced than the age of the Old: the Incarnation would thus appear to have arrested the course of history. Such is the position associated with the name of Barth: it can be called a sort of post Christian gnosticism. From this point of view, the only important event is the resurrection of Christ. The final salvation of men flows from this event, solely in proportion to their belief in it: but there is no working out of salvation in the course of historical time. History brings no increment of real value, and consequently no progress: there is really no point in it. The Barthian preoccupation is therefore with the past event of the Resurrection, more than with the present life of the Church.

Cullmann does indeed repudiate this extreme position, and the fact is worth noting. He acknowledges 'an existing kingdom of Christ and the life of the Holy Spirit in the Church'. But he objects to the Catholic presentation that it over-emphasizes the importance of the growing Church and the living tradition. Our reply must be that the Catholics' appreciation of the development of the Church does not in any way diminish their faith in the unique importance of the fact of the Resurrection; but it does imply recognition of the positive worth of current history, consisting in the growth of the mystical body through the work of the Spirit.

What has been already accomplished once for all time is the union of manhood and godhead in Jesus Christ. What is awaited at the end of all time is the manifestation of Christ's victory, in the transfiguration of the universe and the general resurrection of bodies. But what is now in progress is something invisible, yet supremely real, the building up in charity of that mystical body of Christ that shall be revealed in the last day.

This, then, is the purport and import of current history: the Christian mission. Christ delays his second coming because his Gospel must first 'be preached all over the world, so that all nations may hear the truth; only after that will the end come'.[16] This, be it noted, was already the answer that St Augustine gave to those men of his time who thought that the fall of Rome meant the end of the world: that could not be so, because the Gospel had not yet been preached to the barbarians. Nor is the Christian mission simply to teach the word to individuals of all countries: it is to evangelize the civilizations represented by the real leaders of every people, so that Christianity may find its appropriate and authentic expression in the idiom of every racial community, and the Church be like a bride circumdata varietate, [17]as the Psalmist says. It is a work of ages.

The need to wait until the rest of the world has been evangelized is the explanation and justification, for those who belong to the earliest group of Christian peoples, of the delay of the Second Coming. It is thus really their missionary charity that alone can help them to put up with it. Their distinct vocation is to further the spread of Christianity, whereby they actually hasten the coming of the Lord. But in the meanwhile they have their distinct temptation and risk, like other ripe fruit, which is to fall into decay. The threat of interior decay is the characteristic problem of Christendom: there was a crisis in the sixteenth century, when the Churches were divided; there is another in the twentieth, with the growth of communism. Thus the question of Christian unity has to be seen in historical perspective, just as much as the conversion of the heathen, or of the Jews.

The Christian mission is what gives substance and consistency to the history of our era. It is the intrinsic reality underlying the phenomena of secular history. It means the progressive building-up in love of the incorruptible body of Christ which shall go through the fire of judgement. Being the work of the Holy Ghost, the mission continues the mighty works, the mirabilia Dei, recorded in the two Testaments: the chosen people were brought out of Egypt, Christ was brought back from the dead, in the power of the self-same Spirit through whom the souls of men are saved in baptism. The work of the Spirit is accomplished through the preaching of the word and through the sacraments, which are themselves, as Cullmann clearly recognized, the continuation in the Church of the Wunder in the Bible.

The mere geographical extension of the mission is not, however, the whole meaning of current history. As we have already seen, the Christian outlook implies a notion of progress; there is an element of progress in Church history, and notably in the history of dogma. Of course the object and content of revelation is unchanging; there can be no question here of what is called evolution in the modernist sense: but there is a development of dogma, because the Holy Ghost enables the living Church in its teaching office to define certain aspects of revealed truth which are not explicitly spelt out in the Scriptures. Karl Thieme has clearly brought out the strictly historical quality of these definitions: they are not just the result of theological analysis, nor even of the inner mind of the Church; they correspond to particular historical situations, indicating the main turningpoints in the Church's life. Mohler and Newman recognized in this development one of the distinguishing characteristics of current sacred history.

Continuing thus the series of the wonderful works of God in the world, the life of the Church is traversed by the fact of sin. The powers of evil which were destroyed by the cross of Christ retain the appearance of effective hostility until the Second Coming. Christ's Church is thus at odds with sin as the people of Israel were in former times. In this context, St Augustine distinguished between two different kinds of trial. There is first the opposition of the outside world, where the limiting case is martyrdom: 'The more copiously the Church is watered with the blood of martyrs, the more it grows.' [18] This is the point of insertion of the whole theology of martyrdom, which belongs to the theology of history inasmuch as it embodies and typifies the conflict between sacred and secular history. Martyrdom is thus seen as the archetypal form of conflict with evil, as the summit of Christian sanctity through conformation to Christ, and as the official proclamation of the Gospel to the accredited representatives of the earthly city.

Secondly, however, the enmity of the devil is evinced by divisions within the Church, as well as by persecutions from without: as St Augustine said, 'this vine, as the Lord had foretold, had to be purged, and the unfruitful branches taken away, whence came schisms and heresies, the work of men who sought not the Lord's glory, but their own'. [19] And here should follow the theology of the separation of the Churches and of the return to unity, as Fr Congar has written it: the history of heresy thus acquires a valid theological significance.

* * *


V

So far we have been concerned with the nucleus of sacred history, which is coterminous with the history of the

Church; but this is not the whole of history. We have to consider the relationship of history commonly so-called, the history of civilizations and empires, with the history of salvation: as to which, opinions vary widely. In St Augustine's view, the history of the city of God, which coincides with the history of the Church, is altogether distinct from and antagonistic to the history of the city of Satan, which corresponds to political history. At the opposite extreme, certain evolutionist theories of modern times tend to merge the history of the Church into the universal march of progress: and some Christian thinkers, who would not go so far as that, would prefer to confine the strictly historical facts of progress within the realm of secular history, leaving to the Church indeed the function of impregnating history with the Christian spirit, but not that of making history at all.

On this subject, three observations may conveniently be made here.

First, the interaction of sacred and secular history is an established fact. The Christian outlook embraces the whole field of historical reality. St Irenaeus, in primitive times, saw that universal history was all part of the Divine dispensation; and in this respect he was only expounding the doctrine of Genesis. The Creator and the Redeemer are one and the same God. Civilization is not devils' work: society and culture belong to creation, they are part of the work of God's hands. They represent the organization of a world that has fallen from grace, but is not essentially evil. E. C. Rust rendered valuable service by his clear demonstration of the way in which the totality of world history fits into the pattern of the Christian synthesis. [20] It is a two-way relationship. On one hand, extrinsically, the history of the Church is affected on the surface by the fate of cultures. The Church may be regarded not only as transcendent, but also as incarnate; and from the latter point of view, the history of the Church is a record of the various and successive Christian civilizations -- Palestinian, Byzantine, Medieval, Baroque, Romantic and modern. (For there is nothing wrong, despite certain suggestions to the contrary, in such multiple incarnations of the Church in the different forms of social order: the harm lies in attempts to identify the Church exclusively with any one of these forms.) It is also true that the Church exercises a reciprocal influence on the cultures into which it is adopted. Thus on these extrinsic considerations, the history of Christianity falls within general history, being one of its most important constituents. But from another point of view the history of civilizations falls within the history of salvation. This is not because of any strictly religious value to be attributed to human progress, whether technical or social: by Christian standards this is something indifferent in itself, being capable of evil as well as of good. Whenever a community or a culture assumes the attributes of absolutism, becoming an end in itself, it is in conflict with the city of God. Thus in practice St Augustine's view often proves to be accurate, because it often happens that political organisms are really the city of Satan. The fallen angels of the nations, Mammon, Wotan, Apollo . . . are still there to be aroused; even since Christ's victory on the cross they have still a semblance of power until the judgement day. But on the other hand it is equally possible for any civilization to be subject to God's law. In this case, while human progress itself can never be of any avail to salvation, it is at least 'that which is saved', as St Augustine said of free will; and so the operations of mankind are not in vain. Each one of us shall be in eternity whatever we make of ourselves in this world. The new heavens and the new earth shall be our own universe, just as the labours of men have contrived to shape it, only transfigured: so true it is that the history of civilizations, no less than the history of the natural creation, belongs within sacred history in the largest sense.

Nevertheless, this interaction of sacred and secular history, which constitutes an integral part of the history of salvation, is not the whole of it, or even its most important aspect; the second of our observations at this stage must be to insist that the primary and specific element in history is sacred history itself, that is, the succession of the wonderful works of God through the efficacy of the word and the sacraments: for herein alone consists the real inwardness and hidden substance of the historical process. All the rest, such as the series of Christendoms in which Ecclesia una is embodied, is but the outward vesture of reality. The progress of the Church is not just the record of its influence on technical and social developments: the activity of the Church is not to be measured primarily in terms of its success in humanizing social conditions, or inculcating a right use of leisure, or improving the workers' standard of living. Important as they are, these things are secondary; the essential work of the Church is the liberation of the souls of men from spiritual bondage, though the Church also works for their economic enfranchisement.

The fact of the matter is that the world of human social organization is already obsolete. In this third observation we find another application of strictly historical criteria. The coming of Christ has brought the kingdom of God into being. The only real society now is that of God's people, the Church. Christ's universal and exclusive kingship is an accomplished fact. Earthly civilization survives under a sort of stay of execution until the end of the world. In this particular situation we may see the antinomy which is the tragic drama of Christianity, for the Christian belongs at once to a world that has ceased to be, and to a world that is not yet; as plainly appears, for instance, in the case of war, which arises from the obsolete condition of society, altogether contrary to the Gospel, yet Christians are in it. Hence the Church and temporal society can never enjoy the harmonious relationship of two parallel organizations, where one might be the other's complement and crown. They are two successive periods of history, in dramatic conflict.

* * *


VI

Seeing Christianity and culture face to face, we have been led to consider how they stand in relation to each other in regard to the whole history of salvation. There is another species of confrontation which is of capital importance for the Church today, though it was already one of the preoccupations of such an early writer as Clement of Alexandria: namely, the position of Christianity in relation to the heathen religions.[21] Once again, there are various schools of thought, diametrically opposed to each other. The evolutionary theory of Comparative Religions regards Christianity as a stage in the development of the religious attitude, evolving naturally from earlier forms. At the other extreme, some theologians tend to dismiss all pagan systems as one mass of errors and superstitions, totally lacking any trace of goodness and truth, fit only to be demolished to make room for the Gospel.

As before, it is possible to find in the theology of history a resolution of these difficulties, which preserves what is valid in both theories, and enables us to see how the heathen religions fit into the broad picture of the history of salvation.

In the first place, there is an element of truth in the nature-cults. They belong to the earliest of all the covenants, that made with Noah, wherein God is revealed through the regularity of natural processes, but not yet, as in the covenant with Abraham, through the singularity of historical events. In the rhythms of bodily life, and the movements of the stars, and the succession of the seasons, we can learn something of God and his ways: they are hierophanies, affording us the knowledge of a personal Providence whose faithfulness is attested by their unvarying recurrence. That is the gist of the scriptural account of the promise made to Noah, where the subject-matter was the order of nature, and a rainbow was the attestation. The same doctrine is implicit in the Epistle to the Romans: 'from the foundations of the world men have caught sight of his invisible nature, his eternal power and his divineness, as they are known through his creatures'.[22]  It is defined in the Acts: 'the living God . . . allowed Gentile folk everywhere to follow their own devices; yet even so he has not left us without some proof of what he is; it is his bounty that grants us rain from heaven, and the seasons which give birth to our crops, so that we have nourishment and comfort to our heart's desire.'[23]

The fact remains that this primitive revelation is nowhere to be found free of corruption. That is not to deny the soundness of its foundation; but things have since gone awry. So Emil Brunner was justified in saying that 'no religion in the world is without some elements of truth. No religion is without its profound error.'[24] The same thought appears in the Epistle to the Romans, just after the verse from which the previous quotation was taken: mankind 'exchanged the glory of the imperishable God for representations of perishable man, of bird and beast and reptile'.[25] Idolatry consists in taking the things of nature, wherein God is revealed, as objects of worship. Thus paganism is ambivalent, and incurs condemnation on one hand while exciting compassion on the other. It is truly both a kind of 'toothing-work', from which the building of Christianity may be securely developed, and also the chief obstacle to its progress.

The heathen religions obstruct the march of Christianity because of their obsolescence as much as by their corruption. It is once again a question of historical development. The covenant with Noah was the true religion of mankind until the covenant with Abraham was made; but from that moment it was superseded. From the time of the Gospel it has been doubly obsolete; it is anachronistic twice over. What is wrong with the heathen religions is that they have not made room for revelation. They have not succeeded in playing their difficult part in what Guardini calls the drama of the forerunners: their function was to make way for that which should succeed them, as John the Baptist did for Jesus, and Melchizedek for Abraham at the meeting point of the covenants.[26] But the forerunner is always tempted not to give way, tempted to withstand history, by trying to stop the unfolding of God's design and fix the pattern at the moment of his own contribution: if he does that, the forerunner becomes an antagonist. Guardini gives the example of Buddha as a great forerunner of the Gospel, who may well turn out to be its last opponent.

The supersession of the primitive revelation of nature by the historic covenant does not involve its annihilation, but rather its fulfillment, just as the Old Testament is fulfilled in the New. In both cases, all the real values of the former are taken over into the latter and raised to a higher plane. So, in Genesis, the narrative of Creation and the Fall of Man embodies mythical material, enriched with new meaning. So, too, the Jewish Passover is a celebration of the historical Exodus within the framework of a vegetation-ritual of spring, and itself came afterwards to serve as the liturgical framework for the festival of the Resurrection. Seen in the full context of the history of salvation, the sequence of religious systems is not a mere succession, or a natural evolution, but a series of advances under the creative impulsion of the Holy Ghost.

* * *

The Christian conception of history was plainly not the result of any systematic process of reasoning. As questions arose out of the circumstances of the Church's continued existence in time, so the Church was induced to work out its own idea of the history of salvation. The theology of history became possible only when Christianity had become aware of the fact of its own duration, and enucleated the inner significance of that fact.

 


 

 

PART I

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE


SACRED AND PROFANE HISTORY

 

IT was a just observation of Father Thornton's that although Christianity is itself independent of any particular type of culture -- and therefore independent of modern society -- yet, as every organism must, it 'lives by virtue of its "response" to the environment in which it has been placed by the Creator'.

There is a real problem, though this is not always recognized, about the situation of Christianity in the modern, technocratic world. A worker, a scientist, an economist of the present day may well, and in fact often does, find the outward forms of Christian life bafflingly strange, simply because these derive, as a matter of history, from patterns of social existence that are quite obsolete. Thus he gains an impression that Christianity itself belongs to the past, and corresponds to a state of affairs that no longer exists.

Such views are characteristic of a whole field of contemporary thought. Christianity, regarded as a social phenomenon, is felt to be essentially transient. Its intrinsic worth may not be challenged, but its permanent relevance is denied. It represents a stage, perhaps an essential stage, in human development; but this stage will be left behind. Evidence is produced to show the actual decadence of the system, presaging its early dissolution.[27] On the other hand, in direct contradiction to these opinions, there is a school of thought so anxiously committed to safeguard the transcendence of Christianity as to divorce it altogether from the historical process; but this is escapism, a flight from reality, a withdrawal from the human struggle. It is a return to the gnostic denial of natural values, a condemnation of creaturely existence. We have seen how this pessimistic conception of history is incompatible with the Christian position.

If we are to have an effective grasp of the whole problem, we must recognize a two-fold relationship between Christianity and history. On the one hand, Christianity falls within history. It emerged at a given point in the sequence of historical eventuation. It provides a constituent part of the fabric of recorded facts. To this extent, it belongs to the historian's province to describe its appearance in the chronicle of documented reality. But on the other hand, history falls within Christianity: all secular history is included in sacred history, as a part, a prolegomenon, a preparatory introduction. Profane history covers the whole period of this world's existence, but Christianity is essentially the next world itself, present here and now in a mystery. The fundamental reality of Christianity is 'to come', not just in relation to a particular moment of time, but in relation to all historical time, past, present and future. It is indeed novissimus, the last thing: with Christianity, the end is already achieved. But in the mystery of the being and working of the Christian Church, this thing which is beyond history exists now in historical fact.

Both aspects of this two-fold relationship are equally essential. Take first the inclusion of Christianity in history: this is a real incarnation. As Christ himself belonged to one nation, one culture, one period of time, so the Church is embodied in successive cultural forms -- which are themselves no less transitory than the very civilizations they represent. Karl Marx may show how the economic conditions of first-century Galilee were reflected in the primitive Christianity; or how the Byzantine orthodoxy conformed to the theocratic theory of the Eastern emperors; or how the Reformation followed the economic expansion of the Renaissance, disrupting the medieval forms of social organization: he is discussing what we may call successive Christendoms. In Marxist terminology, these unstable, more or less ephemeral phenomena belong to the superstructure, not to the unchanging, permanently valid infrastructure, which is represented by the Church itself.

The distinction is clearly applicable to the circumstances of the present day. There has been, over the last four centuries, a perfectly normal materialization of Christianity in terms of western civilization. This Christianity of the bourgeois has borne fruit in miracles of charity and holiness. But our world is now in the throes of such a cultural crisis as previous history hardly records: the old world of the bourgeois is in collapse, with all its categories of civilized life and behaviour. This is something quite independent of individual preferences, neither to be applauded nor deplored: but we are witnessing the last convulsions of a dying world, a dying culture; and everything about the Church that intrinsically belongs to this particular culture dies with it. The Christianity of the bourgeois has had its day, and Christian people are well aware of the fact: only, what is passing is not Christianity itself, but the particular embodiment of Christianity in a given social organization.

This is critical for the purposes of our analysis. Christianity ineluctably requires, always, both an incarnation and a detachment. Incarnation, solidarity, is a matter of simple duty. Any attempt to withdraw the Christian religion from its historical settings, into some timeless ideality, is a plain case of mistaken identity. There are critics of our presentday movement towards a workers' Christianity, who complain that this movement is a dangerous error, comparable with Constantine's, when he incorporated fourth-century Christianity into the forms of Byzantine civilization, or with the error of the seventeenth-century Jesuits who imbued Christianity with the culture of the new triumphant bourgeoisie. On the contrary, these earlier incarnations were not mistakes, eitheri they are only obsolete, or obsolescent. As we have seen, this all-important issue is a question of chronology. The emergence of new social patterns does not mean that the old patterns were not right in their day, but only that they are no longer right.

For detachment is just as much a matter of duty as integration. Christianity is not finally identified with any of the types of culture in which it is successively embodied. Just as the distinctive error of Judaism has been a refusal to die and rise again, or a failure to grow up, so it is, in a measure, with those who would petrify Christianity in its former shapes, preserving the incrustations of social custom that belong to past ages. Each one of us is under the obligation to 'die daily' and to be born again 'a new man': St Paul meant what he said, and his language has an application to Christianity itself, which must necessarily adopt the forms of human societies, becoming incarnate as the appropriate Christendom of its time -- but each successive Christendom will be only provisional, and transitory; garments to be put away when they are worn out. The stripping off of these familiar coverings is always a painful business. That is the nature of the crisis through which we are passing at the present time. It would be wrong to underestimate the scale and the difficulty of the process, or to be impatient (as sometimes people are) with the slow and gradual responses of the Church in such a deeply tragic situation, where every decision is loaded with immeasurable consequence.

This is the crux of the business. A middle way must be found between two opposite and equally dangerous errors. On one hand there is what Cardinal Suhard called intégrisme, a conservative attachment to inadequate categories and conceptions wrongly identified with imperishable truth. This archaizing tendency takes various forms, according to the particular stage of history chosen to represent the ideal of Christianity -- it may be a nostalgic hankering after the Primitive Church of the first centuries, or a more or less romantic medievalism, or a desperate attachment to the vanishing outline of bourgeois Christendom. On the opposite side there is the danger of modernism, whereby the necessary process of adaptation is allowed to endanger the essential structure of the depositum fidei, discarding the substance along with its ephemeral accidents.

Of course, any exaggerated concern with the outward forms of religious activity would be symptomatic of a certain superficiality in spiritual understanding. If we have insisted upon the contemporary need for a renewal of these patterns, we are at least entitled to emphasize also our conviction that this does not affect the heart of the matter. What is required of the Church is primarily that it should bestow the gift of Christ's life upon men: what is required of priests is primarily that they should be holy. It is not so important that they should be up to date. Many Christian institutions show their age without loss of vital energy. The roots of Benedictine monachism obviously lie deep in an irrecoverably archaic economic system; the Summa of St Thomas is inextricably bound up with the Aristoteleanism of the thirteenth century; the Ignatian spiritual method is conceived in terms of chivalry: but all the same, St Benedict is still the father of all monks, St Thomas the doctor of all schools, and St Ignatius the master of the Spiritual Exercises. We are not such iconoclasts as to pull down our cathedrals to make room for reinforced concrete churches; there is in fact room for both.

With these qualifications, then, it is clear how and to what extent the Church is a part of history, and subject to the laws that govern the rise and fall of civilizations. The complementary assertion, and much the more important, is that secular history is entirely comprised within sacred history. The latter is strictly the whole of history; the former, a distinct and limited subdivision. As Cullmann has well shown,[28] this has been the Christian philosophers' point of view from primitive times: for though it is true that Christians as such were then chiefly concerned with those historical events upon which our salvation depends, yet they also passed judgement on secular history itself. The Bible insists that God the Lord of creation is one and the same as God the Redeemer of his people: St Irenaeus makes the same point against the gnostics. The history of salvation embraces not only the history of mankind, but the whole of cosmic history.[29] It is not to be conceived as an intrusive enclave within the round of nature and natural history, but as embracing this physical development, for which indeed it provides the meaningful structure: the person of the Redeemer is himself the Creative Word.

In the Christian tradition, the history of salvation begins, not with the choosing of Abraham, but with the creation of the world. St Augustine constantly makes his point. The narratio plena starts with 'in the beginning God made heaven and earth'. So the shape of catechetical instruction follows the order of holy scripture, which itself constitutes the authentic and authoritative chronicle. St Irenaeus held the same position, and emphasized this line of thought with particular reference to the gnostics' doctrine of two demiurges, one creating, the other redeeming. Thus the creation of the universe is the first step in God's plan, which is to culminate only in the creation of new heavens and a new earth. Creation is a wonderful work of God. In it appears the absolute immediate dependence of all that is upon the divine will. But it remains an historical event, itself the inauguration of the time-process, and as such belongs to the general history of salvation.

Then, as we have just observed, the final consummation of this history is to consist in another cosmic event -- the resurrection of the body, or, to use what is really a more appropriate terminology, the creation of the new cosmos, for this event, properly understood, is not simply a physical transformation of mankind, but of the whole creation. So the history of salvation extends from one cosmic event to another, each involving the totality of existence. St Augustine explicitly traces the parallelism of these two creations, in reply to the heathen who find the Christian hope of resurrection a principal stumbling-block: 'Why should you not believe you will exist again after this existence, seeing you exist now after non-existence? . . . Is it harder for God . . . who made your body when it was not, to make it anew when it has been?'[30]

It is not only the beginning and the end of our history that consist in actions on a cosmic scale. The central point is also a creative act, the resurrection of Christ, himself the Word of God, by whom all things were made, who is to come in the fullness of time to make all things new.

As he is the almighty Word of God, whose invisible presence is among us and in all the world, so the effects of his power extend throughout the world in height and depth and length and breadth: for all things are under the rule of salvation through the Word of God, and the Son was crucified for all things, marking creation with the sign of his cross. For it was necessary and fitting that he who took visible form should bring all visible things into a share of his crucifixion: thus his personal influence is sensibly effective in the whole world of visible things. For it is he that lightens in the heights, that is, the heavens, and he that plumbs the deeps, that is, the underworld: he, that spans the length from East to West, and bridges the immeasurable breadth from North to South, bringing the whole race of men in every quarter to the knowledge of his Father.[31]

 

 

The point has lost none of its significance in our own time. Modern man is accustomed to think of the universe in evolutionary terms. If we cannot show that the cosmic order itself is subject to the sovereign influence of Christ's redemption, then the history of salvation is liable to be merged in the world-process: the person of Christ fades into a universal Werden, the impersonal evolutionary trend. Traces of such a conception can be detected in some modern Christian theories of evolution:[32] but it is essential for us to establish that the creative action of the Word is not the blind working of an immanent force. Envisaged from the point of view of the history of salvation, the entire universe is the field of activity of the creative Word who made it, and maintains it in being, and came when it had fallen under the sway of alien Powers, not to destroy, but to set it free and transform it.

Within this frame of reference, how shall the relationship of the Church to political and economic society be expressed? In this question also there are two contrary extremes. On one view, the progress of science and material civilization appears to be directly related to the kingdom of God, so that the former may almost be represented as a means -- even the means par excellence -- of advancing the latter. This is clearly a dangerous position, involving a devaluation of the Church's currency, a disregard of the spiritual law of the Church's life and growth, in favour of scientific or political action conceived as intrinsically religious. At the opposite pole, social and technological advances are sometimes regarded as wholly indifferent, or even diabolically hostile to the kingdom of God. Science is presented as an attempt of the human reason to usurp the Creator's prerogative: political activity, as an aggressive symptom of the human lust for power, seeking world domination.

Neither thesis is admissible. Organized society derives from the plan of creation, and cannot be radically evil. For this reason, when political organization is made an end in itself, whether as nationalism, democracy, progress or what not, it represents the city of Satan over against the city of God.

This was formerly an essential element of Christian teaching, as may be seen in St Augustine De catechizandis rudibus:

Two cities, one of sinners and one of saints, are to be found throughout history from the creation of mankind until the end of the world: at the present day they are mingled together in body, but separate and distinct in will; in the day of judgement, they will be separated bodily. All men who take pleasure in the lust of power and the spirit of domination, in the pomps and vanities of the world, and all spiritual substances who approve these things and take pride in subjecting men to themselves, all these are united in one city: even when they fight among themselves over such advantages, they are none the less borne down together in the same direction by one and the same burden of cupidity, and bound together by common behaviour and deserts. On the other hand, all such as humbly seek the glory of God . . . belong together in one city.[33]

St Augustine's presentation of this theme reveals the dramatic quality of the history of salvation. There are, as he says, angels as well as men in both cities. The drama of mankind is unfolded in the context of a wider conflict, between the spiritual Powers that hold men captive, and the angels of God under the kingship of Christ. The human tragedy is a visible representation of this spiritual warfare. St Augustine follows the general patristic tradition in recognizing a connexion between fallen angels and human idolatry. The opposition of the two cities divides the worshippers of the true God from the worshippers of idols; and the worship of idols consists in treating human productions as absolute realities. The wicked spirits of the gentile nations are still at work, and resume their power whenever a people or a class or a social group of any kind becomes an end in itself: or in the limiting case when mankind as a whole makes an idol of humanity.

Alternatively, the earthly city can be assimilated and taken up into the history of salvation; the principalities and powers of this world can become part of the city of God, when 'earthly rulers themselves forsaking those idols in whose name they were wont to persecute Christians, acknowledge and worship the one true God and Christ our Lord', and when they 'afford peace to the Church -- albeit a temporal peace -- and quiet opportunity to build up her spiritual edifice'.[34] But there is no middle way between these alternatives of war and peace. No autonomous secular order can exist as part of God's ordinance without integration in the order of Christ and His Church. Outside this pattern, apart from the sovereign jurisdiction of God, everything belongs to the city of Satan, the world and the flesh. It remains true, however, as St Augustine reminds us, that the line of demarcation is not visibly drawn -- a man may be a member of the visible Church and yet belong to the city of Satan; and vice versa.

These are then the basic principles for a religious interpretation of the history of mankind in society. The history of civilization does not conform to a law of continuous evolutionary progress; nor does it consist in a Spenglerian succession of discontinuous and independent cultures; it is to be regarded as a series of καίροι, moments of decision, crises, each representing at once the break-up and the condemnation of a society that has committed the sin of ßριç in the pride of life -- each consisting also in a parallel renewal of the Church through purgation. These decisive moments, times and seasons, each reflect the supreme ̻Aαίροç of the passion and resurrection of Jesus, as they also anticipate the ultimate ̻Aαίροç of the Last Judgement. Bultmann's conception of the Judgement as an abiding reality is thus reconcilable with faith in the judgement to come; for each individual, judgement is always with us in a continuous present, but for the whole world of created existence there must be a confrontation of crises, a verdict of damnation and salvation. The Judgement is in truth always upon us, yet still withheld; history consists in a perpetual judgement of the world, whereof the Second Coming will be simply the final pronouncement.

 


 

 

CHAPTER TWO

 
CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURES

 

AMONG the most important developments of our age is the formation of modern nation-states by peoples hitherto subject to the Western hegemony. In the Far East, Japan was the first to be emancipated. China is for the time being under the Communist yoke, but has at any rate broken away from the economic control formerly exercised by Great Britain and the United States. India, now independent, aims at the quality and status of a great power. Something of the same kind is happening in the Near East, where the Arab world is notoriously in a state of ferment. Egypt has followed Turkey on the road to national autonomy; and last but not least, the state of Israel has been refounded after a break of two millennia. None of these revolutions is exclusively political; in each case there has been a cultural awakening as well. India and Israel may look to the West for industrial or scientific methods and skills, but they are also determined to foster and revive their own religious, literary and social traditions. The political upheavals of the Arab peoples are accompanied by manifestations of intense religious activity. The Oriental races exploit the resources of modern technology for the benefit of their own distinct philosophies of life.

This development brings the Church up against a serious problem. Hitherto we have been content to think of civilization as meaning Western civilization -- which, during the ages, we have moulded into Christian patterns. We now have to recognize the existence and vitality of other civilizations, which are not Christian. It is of no use in this context to insist that Chritianity is universal; any such pretension is liable to involve a most dangerous fallacy. As long ago as the third century Tertullian believed that the whole world was Christian. True, there were Christians at that time in all the known world, that is throughout the Mediterranean basin; but they were mostly Roman settlers. Christianity had not made much impression on the native populations. When the Roman civilization collapsed, the true state of affairs was discovered plainly enough: the Romans retreated from Africa and the shores of the Black Sea -- and Christianity vanished along with them. Since then, Christianity has penetrated to every quarter of the globe; but once again, the spread of the gospel has not gone much beyond the Portuguese, Spanish, or French tradingposts, or outside the zone of immediate Western influence. The same consequence appears today. As the range of European rule is restricted in the former colonial territories, so Christianity is in retreat. Our religion is still regarded locally as a foreign import.

In these circumstances there is a plain and pressing requirement for a re-incarnation of Christianity in the form of these resurgent civilizations, the Oriental, the NearEastern, the African. . . . In this way alone can the Christian religion take root among the populations. It has become part of our Western heritage only because it has been incorporated into our cultural traditions; the concrete thing called Western Christianity exists because there have been such men as St Augustine, as Dante, Pascal or Camoëns. In other cultural traditions, the story is entirely different -- they remain intrinsically and homogeneously pagan. In such a case, Christianity can only be a foreign body: as it has engendered no native cultural monument of any value, it has no place in the tradition of the people. This is of immense significance in missionary work; for it means that Christianity is precluded from any influence upon just those dominant social groups which maintain the distinctive cultural patterns of any society; its impact upon the people can only be at the periphery; and conversion will inevitably be regarded as an act of treason against the national way of life. All this would be changed if Christianity were an essential element in that way of life. Thus it is clear that the civilization itself must first be christened before its leaders can be converted; and such conversions are an essential precondition of any lasting establishment of Christianity.

There is nothing extravagant about this vitally important process of evangelizing exotic cultures. Christianity is not essentially linked to any one form of cultural tradition; it is not even a product of civilization, but an historic act of God. The fact that its development has chiefly taken place in the Western world does not mean that it is a Western phenomenon. The revelation was in any case first bestowed upon a people of semitic origin and language. Christ was an Aramaic-speaking Jew. The preaching of the Gospel to the Greco-Roman world represented a first translation of the Word of God into terms of another civilization. Today we need another translation. There is nothing extraordinary about this, as the Popes have recognized in their insistence upon the need for native clergy.

But although the process is perfectly normal, it is none the less enormously difficult, as will appear when the formidable problems involved are fairly examined. In the first place, the cultures in question are never found in the pure state, as simple human structures, but always impregnated with religious elements of an idolatrous or other nonChristian kind; so that they are incapable of absorption into Christianity without being first purged of this dross -- which takes a long time. The immediate reaction of a native convert is to abandon his traditional aesthetic and intellectual categories along with the paganism they enshrined: he takes his Catholicism as he finds it, from the West. He would be shocked to think of building a Christian church to look like a temple, or singing hymns to our Lady with melodies taken from the repertory of heathen incantations. It was just the same in the earliest days of Christianity: the first generations of Western converts rejected the whole body of GrecoRoman culture together with its pagan implications. Centuries elapsed before the dross could be purged away, and the essential humanities refined out in an assimilable condition. Thus, at first, no Christian was allowed to teach grammatica, for Homer and Virgil were the pagans' catechism. By the seventeenth century, children could be taught classics without fear of their worshipping Diana or Aesculapius: but it had taken a millennium and a half in the life of Christendom to reach this stage.

A second problem arises from the difficulty of idioms, and the question how to transpose the data of revelation from one cultural and linguistic medium into another. Christianity is by now so deeply rooted in the Western way of life, borrowing from Western sources so much of its theological and liturgical terminology, and its social patterns, that it seems impossible to disentangle them. Admittedly, this kind of transposition took place in the time of Christian origins, from the Semitic into the Greco-Latin tradition; but the operation was one of extreme delicacy and difficulty, and took centuries to complete. When St John rendered the Hebrewdabar by the Greek λόγοç, it was a very bold thing to do, even though the Hebrew Bible had already been translated into Greek at Alexandria -- itself an epoch-making event of limitless consequence for the future. These transferences could not be the work of a day. The term λόγοç had over-tones of pantheism or rationalism, which had to be suppressed. The earliest Christian heresies can be regarded, for the most part, as a sort of revenge taken by the Greek language for the efforts made to force it to describe new things.

Finally there is the third question: is this very difficult enterprise worth while? Granted that one of the characteristic developments of our time is the growing-up into adult nationhood of 'native' societies -- is it possible to feel sure that the new nations will be able to withstand the pressure of an expanding Western civilization? Toynbee has enumerated twenty-two civilizations in the course of human history, many of which have disappeared altogether -- as, for instance, in Mesopotamia, the Akkadian and Sumerian; in the Mediterranean basin, the Hittite, Aegean and Etruscan; in America the Inca and the Aztec. Why should the civilizations of India, China and Africa escape? Perhaps the future course of history will be in the direction of a single worldwide extension of Western civilization: in which case the current identification of Christianity with European culture would represent a permanent reality. In favour of this hypothesis it may be urged that, in the world as we know it today, there is no civilization properly so-called but the Western -- the others serve merely to recall the lineaments of an older world that has had its day: in the ordinary course of things they must be expected to pass away.

Such views have been vigorously enunciated by Karl Thieme. He links the Church closely with Western civilization, which he regards as, simply, civilization itself. His method is as follows. He lays it down that there are two essential, constitutive pre-requisites for the existence of 'history': first, the continuity of one and the same 'bearer' (Träger) of successive events. For this continuity, geography is not enough: the land of Canaan has long been the site of a series of events, but with no single subject or Träger, and thus no continuity. Secondly, there must be changes which amount to a true transformation: so that, on Thieme's hypothesis, there has been no Greek history since the second century B.C., and no Egyptian history since the fall of the Ptolemaic dynasty -- and, by the same token, no Chinese history before the sixteenth century A.D.

In Thieme's view, the necessary conditions have only once been fulfilled, namely, in the case of Western civilization. In this solitary instance, we find a single continuous subject of changes which successively transform the Roman empire into medieval Christendom, and this into modern civilization. So the West is the locus of history: and other races have progressively come to figure in history solely through contact with the West. Western history is essentially the whole of history, and Western civilization the whole of civilization. The highest representative of Western civilization was the Roman Senate; after its fall in the ruins of the Roman empire, the Church took over this function of a supreme court, which it still has. The Church proves to be the heiress of Senate as well as of Synagogue, the residuary legatee of both secular and sacred history. In this two-fold capacity, the Church is a source of culture no less than of sanctity -- the Elect Event, the mysterious heart of all history.

There could be no stronger affirmation of the identity of history itself with the development of our own civilization: nor is the argument devoid of solidity. It is undeniable that Western civilization has, as a matter of fact, obtained a position of unique ascendancy in the world, and that, on its merits, it has rendered unique service to those ideals of justice and freedom that are of the essence of all truly humane society. But for our own part, we would be chary of linking together too intimately the Church and the Imperium, the Roman theme and the Latin theme. In this part of his work, Thieme does less than justice to the Eastern world -- whether of Byzantium or of Benares. We remain convinced that there is such a thing as Eastern civilization -- and Eastern history, too. Admittedly these systems fall short of their proper stature, so long as they are deprived of those principles of truth that the Church alone can dispense: but they have the same propaedeutic value as the Greco-Roman systems. Thieme's point of view is too exclusively European; there is no room in his picture for the theology of the Mission.

We can now formulate certain conclusions. We start from the belief in a fundamental unity in the spirit of man, which underwrites the truth of scientific and metaphysical judgements. Western achievements in this way belong to the common inheritance of mankind. The differences of idiom between one people and another can only affect methods of enunciation, which derive from special patterns of mental habit -- they cannot affect the truth of statements, which is universally valid. In the particular case of Christianity, it is of course obvious that, after two millennia of Western history, this religion, as it exists today, cannot be properly understood without some prior understanding of the Western way of life; but this does not by any means imply that Christianity may not in future materialize in altogether different shapes. The great Chinese Benedictine, Dom Lou, shows a fine understanding of this point, in a book whose title epitomizes a whole programme of education: La rencontre des humanités -- Humanities in contact'. Granted that a Chinese will have to learn Latin in order to gain a real knowledge of Christianity, he argues that in future this ought not to be a one-way traffic; more Western Christians must learn to appreciate the worth of Oriental culture. For in time to come, the Latins in their turn will find in a Far Eastern Christendom sources of unsuspected wealth. For this reason (if for no other), one of the best ways in which intellectuals can serve the interests of religion is to specialize in Oriental or African studies: in such directions their work can effectively help to catholicize the Church.

Here, then, are two distinct points of view, in the convergence of which it becomes possible to find the objective solution of a very difficult problem. First, as we have seen, the Church is not to be identified with any single race, culture or society; just as Christianity, whose original idiom was Aramaic, absorbed in time the culture of the Hellenes and finally the social structure of Rome, so now the Church must grow to be Chinese in China and Indian in India -all things to all men. . . .

But secondly, the Church, in its freedom from any permanent attachment to a particular civilization, derives an imperishable enrichment from each of the cultures with which it is united: and equally -- to take a particular example -- China can welcome Catholicism, and allow it to take root in Chinese culture, without repudiating the capital value of its existing investment in Latin forms, which would indeed be a ridiculous act of xenophobic self-impoverishment; the new accretion represents for the recipient a gain beyond all human expectation. The true Church is no more Greek or Latin than Chinese or Indian. The Church of the future will have passed through all history and incorporated every variety of human civilization, in order to wear that wedding dress, 'a robe of rich embroidery',[35] for the eternal union with the Bridegroom.

In the second of these two complementary points of view, it is clear that the Church is characterized for ever by its Semitic origins -- the word of God is always the message that was originally given in Hebrew. It is equally clear that the Church has ineradicable connexions with the Latin culture, and with the historical circumstances of Petrine Rome; but it is also true that the Church can never lose its tincture of Hellenism. This last point deserves to be emphasized. The Church was born in Judaea, but grew up in Hellas: the Church's liturgy and theology are radiant with the traces of this education. Pius XI has said that we Catholics are spiritual Semites -- we are spiritual Hellenes, too. As the great orthodox theologian Florovsky excellently says:

Hellenism has come to stay in the Church, as an integral component, being in fact a permanent category of Christianity. This has of course nothing to do with racial types, or with any particular geographical delimitation of Hellas -- still less with modern Levantine realities. Our concern is with Christian antiquity, and in that field with Hellenism in doctrine, liturgy and art. In the liturgy in particular, will be found the definitive formulation of the typical Hellenic devotion to the holy mysteries -- so much so, that it is practically impossible to appreciate the inwardness of liturgical praxis without some initiation into the mystique of Hellenism. It is wrong to think of the Church as having passed through a Greek phase: any theologian who falls into this way of thought, setting aside the Hellenistic categories as though they were obsolete, is simply drifting out of the main stream of Catholic communion. Theological catholicity presupposes Hellenism.

The persistent Hellenism of the Church is evident in the form of the liturgy: 'baptism' and 'eucharist' are Greek words, and in the Kyrie Eleison of every Mass we repeat one of the most primitive prayers of Greek Christendom. The permanent structure of Christian theology is even more profoundly Hellenized, for it was born in the Greek-speaking world. The very word 'theology' symbolizes the blessed union of Christian thought with the language in which it came to maturity. Its earliest formulation was in the expressions and categories of Plato and Aristotle, giving it a character it can never lose. The same is true of spirituality, where 'ascesis' and 'mysticism' are Greek words again: and despite Nygren and others who regard it as a mistake, there is nothing more wonderful than the definitive linking of the Greek 'eros' -- the Platonic nostalgia for the world of ideas -- with the Christian 'agape', the wholly free gift of the love of the Blessed Trinity which over-abundantly fulfils the deepest longings of mankind.

It may be said that this Hellenism belongs to the Eastern Churches, that it is no concern of ours: but that is what I strongly dispute. It is our Hellenism. It belongs to the whole catholica. The cultural divergence between the Eastern and Western Churches, which eventually led to doctrinal schism, need never have happened if the matter had been rightly understood. Dom Olivier Rousseau has lately drawn attention to the happy days when a friend of St Jerome's, called Gerontius, used to celebrate the holy mysteries alternately according to the Roman and Byzantine rites -- and needed no particular authorization for this: the Byzantines were not supposed to have a monopoly of Greek; it belonged to the universal Church. Dom Lou's idea is the same: there should not be a Chinese Church in China and a Latin Church in Italy, but a Church in China that is Latin as well as Chinese, while the Church in Italy should be Chinese as well as Latin. That is what is meant by Catholicism -- that is the true 'reunion': and one contribution towards it is for us to re-awaken the spirit of Hellenism in the heart of the Roman church.

The fact that Christianity has been embodied in Western civilization is a great and lasting achievement, part of the Divine scheme of redemption, a splendid tradition commanding our undivided loyalty. For all that, we must never forget that this is only one incarnation of Christianity: the Christian message transcends all cultures and all forms of society; the Gospel must be received by all the peoples of the earth; and so long as the Christian religion has not been deeply rooted in every civilization, so as to find expression in its native language, its dialectic, its philosophy, its art -so long as Christianity has not exploited and hallowed the hidden cultural treasures of every people, we must recognize that something is wanting yet.

These are the principles at stake in the grave problems of unity and catholicity. The Church cannot but be ecclesia una, one true Church because there is one God, one baptism, one Christ: but this unity cannot but be a catholic unity, the divers peoples and cultures being one in the Church without prejudice to their distinctive properties. There is always a temptation to turn the idea of unity into that of uniformity; in matters of organization, to think of unity as meaning centralization, and in matters of doctrinal expression to think in terms of terminological identity. On the contrary, there is no real unity without catholicity, which implies a continuing diversity of mentality, culture and civilization, within the single round of one faith, one Church, one dogma, one Eucharist. That is how the Church takes possession of the world to hallow it for God's acceptance. Just as Christ was incarnate in the Jewish race, so the Church must become incarnate in every nation in order to redeem it. The problems of unity and catholicity impinge at this point and in this manner upon the task of the Mission, namely to make known throughout the world the Church's message.

From this point of view, too, the present time is thus an exceptional period in church history: for it is in our own day that the essential requirements we have described have come to be most clearly recognized, now that the great non Western civilizations are growing up, and properly insist upon being treated no longer as children but as equal kinsmen with a right to live their own lives. The consequences of this development are far-reaching. Pius XII showed his awareness of this more than ten years ago, when he declared that we must no longer think only of the contribution the West could make for the benefit of the coloured races: that we have now to live in a world where the relationship of various Churches is mutual; that the West will expect to learn from the Christendom of China, or of Viet-Nam, or of Africa, no less than these Churches may learn from the West. This ideal of equal fellowship in the enjoyment of a commonwealth is at once essentially catholic and essentially missionary.

We cannot all be said to have really grasped it yet. Indeed, we may be approaching the matter from the opposite angle, feeling a scandalized astonishment at the variations of Catholicism, instead of admiring its inexhaustible wealth. The missionary approach, which we have to cultivate, is not just a tolerant acceptance of the distressing aberrations we have to put up with; it recognizes and welcomes a state of affairs which in the wonderful providence of God helps towards the enlargement of the frontiers of his kingdom, embracing diversity in unity. We must put away all narrow insularity of views, as well as every trace of xenophobia; we must recognize in the infinite variety of the Church one of her best titles to our affection.

 


 

CHAPTER THREE

 
CONFUSION OF TONGUES

 

IT is clear from the opening pages of the Bible that the speech-barriers between peoples are a factor of some significance in the religious history of mankind, for they are there represented as a consequence of sin. The eleventh chapter of Genesis tells us that the Lord 'said, Here is a people all one, with a tongue common to all'.[36] But when they decided in the pride of their hearts to build a tower at Babel, that is Babylon, that should reach to Heaven (symbol of world-domination), Jehovah determined to 'throw confusion into the speech they use there, so that they will not be able to understand each other'.[37] This linguistic disruption of the human family was a favourite subject for theological commentary in former times, both among Jews and Christians: it was considered in the context of a belief that each nation had its own angel.

Let us examine first a passage in Origen Contra Celsum. On both sides in the controversy it was agreed that God had divided out the earth among angelic powers, each of whom had received for his share a portion of territory with all its inhabitants. But Origen interpreted the principles of the arrangement differently from Celsus. The pagan writer regarded it as a primordial and invariable decree. Origen objected that, on this view, the distribution must be purely arbitrary, or a matter of mere chance; whereas, of course, his whole system requires, and depends upon, the intrinsic relation of all inequality, whether among angels or among men, to the antecedent merits or deserts which involve these consequential rewards and penalties. It was therefore necessary for him to find an intelligible justification for the apportionment of peoples to angels.

His solution goes back to the Tower of Babel. Mankind was at first one people. They lived in one part of the world, in the East. They spoke one language, Hebrew. They were ruled by Jehovah. But they came out of the East, and settled upon the plain of Sennaar: and there determined to conquer Heaven. For their punishment God handed them over to angels of greater or less wickedness, who gave to each people his own language, and took them away into various lands according to their deserts, some to the tropics, some to the regions of snow and ice. Israel alone, which had not left the East, kept the original tongue, and remained Jehovah's people.[38]

The argument presupposes an established body of doctrine on the subject of national angels, considered as acting in obedience to the will of God, faithful to the role with which he has entrusted them in guiding the destinies of men: it is not to be confused with the doctrine of the fallen angels, who also play a part in national history. Its analogies are rather with the accounts given of angelic influences in nature, upon the cosmic scale. Thus in both cases the angels themselves, whether of the nations or of the heavenly bodies, are not to blame for any idolatrous worship they receive -- this is all the fault of men. St Paul's words about the 'robbing' of the angelic principalities[39] require a similar background of doctrine: the rule of the powers is not, in his conception, evil, but obsolete, like the Mosaic law itself, since the coming of Christ. With Origen, the whole system is explicitly and formally developed, along Christian lines.

Seen in this light, these speculations prove to be of universal application, as part of the general Christian theology of history: for they furnish an interpretation of one of the paradoxes of the current epoch, namely, the co-existence in one world of the pre-Christian system of nationalities simultaneously with the single world-wide system of Catholic unity -- corresponding respectively to the angelic governments, and to the Kingship of Christ. The same theory also indicates a line of convergence with modern scientific researches into the origin of myths, since it is in the subconscious tendency of social collectivities to personalize and deify their national ideals that the psychologists of religion now find the solution of their problem. On the other hand, this tendency can equally be regarded as the national idolatry of tutelary spirits.

Here, Origen echoes a Jewish theological tradition, which is exemplified in the following passage:

And do not forget the Lord your God . . . who was chosen by our father Abraham when the nations were divided in the time of Phaleg. For at that time the Lord . . . came down from his highest heavens, and brought down with him seventy ministering angels, Michael at their head. He commanded them to teach the seventy families which sprang from the loins of Noah seventy languages. . . . But the holy language, the Hebrew language, remained only in the house of Shem and Eber, and in the house of Abraham our father, who is one of their descendants. And on that day Michael took a message from the Lord, and said to the seventy nations . . . 'You know the . . . confederacy into which you entered against the Lord . . . now choose today whom you will worship, and who shall be your intercessor . . .' Nimrod . . answered . . .: 'For me there is none greater than he who taught me and my people in one hour the language of Kush.' In like manner also answered Put, and Migraim, and Tubal, and Javan, and Mesech, and Tiras; and every nation chose its own angel . . . But . . . Abraham answered, 'I choose and select only Him who said, and the world was created . . .' Then the Most High dispersed the nations and allotted to every nation its share and lot . . . Only the house of Abraham remained with his Creator.[40] 1

It is clear that this narrative contains much that is also to be found in Origen: the distribution of the nations among the angelic powers; the angelic origin of the national languages; the preservation by Israel alone of the primitive speech, Hebrew: the status of the chosen people, being the reward of faithfulness. There are also points of difference. Thus the Jewish account is in two stages: first the linguistic separation, even before the project of Babel, and secondly the physical dispersion, consequent upon the nations all, except Israel, taking their angels for gods -- Abraham here representing the chosen race. Another feature that does not appear in the passage we have quoted from the Contra Celsum is the coming of the seventy angels: but Origen alludes to this elsewhere, in a difficult passage of the de Principiis, when the 'seventy men of Israel who came into Egypt[41] are a figure of the coming of the seventy holy fathers [that is, angels] into the world, as God allowed, for the instruction of men'.[42] This obviously refers to the Haggada of the Testament of Naphtali.

Each of these themes is more or less commonplace in the old Jewish tradition. The allocation of the nations to angelic rulers appears in the Septuagint version of Deuteronomy: 'When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance . . . he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the angels of God.'[43]

Equally traditional is the coming down of the angels to earth, to take up from God their commission to govern the peoples -- something altogether different from the expulsion of the fallen angels from Heaven: it appears in the Book of Jubilees ( IV: 15).

The figure seventy for the number of tutelary angels is given in the eighty-ninth chapter of Enoch. The special position of Abraham at the time of the dispersal of the nations is described in the first-century Liber Antiquitatum, formerly ascribed to Philo ( VI: ed. Kisch, 1949, pp. 126etseq.).  The interpretation of nature-myths, particularly in the form of astral cults, as an idolatrous worship of angels, has a long history ( Wis.15: 2; Col.2: 16). Even the connexion between tongues and angels is attested in Scripture (1 Cor.13: 1). The idea of a divine origin of Hebrew is found in Jubilees, XII: 26.

But even the peculiarly Origenistic conception of a punitive mission of angels, on the occasion of the Tower of Babel, to disrupt the communications of men and to scatter them abroad, can be paralleled in Philo of Alexandria. The context relates to the passage in Genesis, dealing with the confusion of tongues: 'It would be well to go down and throw confusion [descendamus, et confundamus] into the speech they use there'.[44] The use of the first person plural is open to a polytheistic construction, and was in fact sometimes so construed: as in Flavius Josephus -- 'the gods sent out the winds to bring down that tower, and gave to every man his separate language'[45] -- and in Abydenos.[46] Philo argues, against this interpretation, that Jehovah was not speaking to gods, but to angels. 'God is one, but he has around him numberless Potencies, which all assist and protect created being, and among them are included the powers of chastisement.'[47] But some men, dazzled by the brightness of these Powers, took and held them for gods.[48] It seems plain that this refers directly to a tradition, represented for us by Josephus and Abydenos, in which the confusion of tongues was attributed to gods. Similarly, Philo goes on to mention the opinion of certain literalist interpreters who would derive from Babel the source of 'various Greek and barbarian idioms'.[49]  

The special interest of this passage of Philo is in the way in which the esoteric doctrine of national angels is used, from the first, to account for the fact of national polytheisms in the face of Jewish belief in one God. Philo was confronted with various syncretistic systems, all more or less tainted with polytheism: and indeed the whole of his treatise De confusione linguarum is directed against the tendency visible, for example, in Abydenos, to adapt the Old Testament narratives in terms of pagan mythology; not that he rejects the syncretistic tradition in toto, but constantly rectifies it in accordance with Jewish orthodoxy. In the instance now under discussion, he may have been the first to infer an allusion to angels in the story of Babel, for his own doctrinal purpose, or he may have followed an earlier tradition on this point: he is in any case the first known authority for this interpretation.

To return to Origen, the next question is to know whether he found the legacy of Jewish traditions for himself in the written apocrypha (with which he was certainly familiar), or orally from rabbis (with some of whom he was personally acquainted): or whether, on the other hand, this was something already incorporated into the Christian sources at his disposal. In favour of the latter hypothesis it must be said that there is solid evidence, from the earliest days of Christianity, of a developed Jewish Christian theology among the converted rabbis of Palestine, and that much of the Judaic tradition -- particularly in the field of angelology -- was thus assimilated into Christian thought. Traces of this work are to be found in such texts as the Gospel of St Peter or the Ascension of Isaiah. The same primitive development is represented in the oral traditions reported by Papias, Irenaeus and Clement as deriving from presbyters of the Apostolic period -- presumably, as we have said, converted rabbis. And it persists in those heretical aberrations of Judaeo-Christianity known to us through the pseudo-Clementine writings.

These last-mentioned works furnish certain parallels with the account given by Origen. In the eighth of the pseudoClementine Homilies, angels come down to earth to take care of mankind; here, too, appears the idea of angelic incarnation, which is also found in Origen. Again in Recognitiones I: 30, the Hebrew language, which God gave to mankind, is said to have remained in use as a single common speech until the sixteenth generation, when the sons of men left the East, and took possession of separate territories, which were denominated by each group in its own tongue. It will be observed that this account, like that of the Testament of Naphtali, differs from Origen's in that it does not connect the separation of nations and languages directly with the Tower of Babel.

The two themes -- of national angels, and of the distinction of tongues -- appear in conjunction in the eighteenth Homily, 4: 'According to the number of the Children of Israel when they went into Egypt, which was seventy, the Father determined the frontiers of the nations by seventy different languages. He gave his Son, who is called the Lord, the Hebrew nation for his portion, and proclaimed him the God of gods, that is of the gods to whom the other nations were allotted. All these gods gave laws for their own, that is the gentile nations: but the Son gave the law that runs among the Hebrews.' In Recognitiones ( II: 42), also, the seventy (or seventy-two) nations are divided up among the angels, whom their subjects mistake for gods, though the angels themselves make no claim to divine honours.[50] The former of these two texts may be usefully compared with what Origen wrote in the de Principiis about the seventy men who went down into Egypt, symbolizing the seventy angelic instructors.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Jewish tradition exhibits practically every element in Origen's doctrine of nationalities. It is true that Origen goes further than any one of the sources we have examined, in particularizing the linguistic activity of the national angels; the most detailed development is as follows: 'In Genesis, when God says -doubtless to his angels -- "Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language", is it not clear that different angels have given mankind a diversity of language and dialects, one giving his people the speech of Babylon, . . . another the speech of the Hellenes?'[51] 1 It is also true that Origen emphasizes the penal character of speech-barriers, to a greater extent than the haggada. But there is no means of deciding whether, even in these points, Origen was elaborating his material for his own purpose, or simply drawing on traditional sources that are no longer extant. Either way, his account represents the supreme attempt of all to analyse and define the particular phase of humanity denoted by the confusion of tongues.

But the state of affairs so described was ordained to be totally disorganized by the coming of Christ, who inaugurated a new régime: the Word of God incarnate took upon himself, without intermediary agencies, the government of the universe and the supreme direction of history. The angels were removed from the place they had occupied, under the providence of God, in the old order. Among several Pauline allusions to this theme, the most important is in the Epistle to the Colossians 'the dominions and powers he robbed of their prey, put them to an open shame, led them away in triumph, through' [52]his cross. These are the principalities that ruled over the nations: 'in those childish days of ours we toiled away at the schoolroom tasks which the world gave us. . . . Formerly, you had no knowledge of God; you lived as the slaves of deities who were in truth no deities at all. Now you. have recognized the true God, or rather, the true God has recognized you. How is it that you are going back to those old schoolroom tasks of yours, so abject, so ineffectual, eager to begin your drudgery all over again?'[53] -- that is, the old régime, when mankind was subject to the rule of angelic governors: a régime that was abolished when God exalted Christ 'high above all princedoms and powers and virtues and dominations, and every name that is known, [and] . . . put everything under his dominion'.[54] It is a disputed point of exegesis whether these defeated powers should be understood as good or evil. For Cullmann they are evil, for Benoit good, for Cerfaux ambivalent. On the one hand it was a providential order of things that was abolished in the dispossession of angelic governors: but as this constitution had been corrupted through the work of the fallen angels, the catastrophe wears, on the other hand, also the appearance of Christ's victory over the insurgent powers of darkness.

Origen was perfectly aware of this duality. He was prompt to show how the good angels welcomed Christ's coming to their aid, and freely proffered him their services: 'It was a great joy for those who had charge of men and nations that Christ came into the world'.[55]

According to Cerfaux, the thought was already in St Paul: 'The angels preserved inviolate their original delegated powers in relation to creatures, and submitted themselves freely and unreservedly to the kingly role of Christ.' But it was otherwise in the case of the fallen angels: 'In Christ was fulfilled the word of Scripture, that "Thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies". . . . Thus the angels who held the nations in subjection were consumed with anger to see Christ's coming to take away their power: as it is written "The Kings of the earth . . . and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his anointed".'[56] Nor was it only their tyranny that Christ came to destroy, but also their intellectual delusions and pseudoscience: 'When the princes of the nations saw that the Lord was come into the world to ruin the doctrines of their so called learning, they set traps for him.'[57]

The question remains to know what shall be the effects of this dispossession of the angels upon the dependent social and political structures: are these abolished in reality, along with their spiritual prototypes? Is the whole diversity of peoples, cultures and tongues to disappear, along with polytheism? The several answers proposed for this question correspond to differing eschatological theories.

One point, however, is established beyond doubt: Christ inaugurates a new phase of' existence, in which former lines of demarcation have vanished. Instead of the old order, based on the separation of races, languages and cultures, there is one new world in Christ. This unity was symbolized by the Pentecostal gift of tongues -- the converse of the Tower of Babel -- re-establishing the means of communication between the various families of mankind. The nations have re-discovered a common speech. At the same time they have come under the leadership of one Shepherd, the prince of Shepherds. In this respect, Cullmann's observation is sound, that the kingly government of Christ is already effectual, and embraces the whole range of human existence.

But if we consider the meaning of Christ's monarchy in relation to the kingdoms of this world, we find two contrary principles of interpretation. The first is represented by Eusebius, who considered the unification of the world as something already achieved, even at the level of material and political consideration: the separate individuality of nations being conceived as abolished together with polytheism. The Christian Empire had effected the unity of the whole world; the imperial monarchy was the visible manifestation of monotheism. In this view, the kingship of Christ is not merely ecclesiastical, and does not have to await the last day for the fullness of its realization in human society: it is a fact of contemporary politics and civilization.

The doctrinal background of this thesis is obviously to be found in a strict identification of political organization with the régime of the angels: so that the dispossession of the angels necessarily involves the disappearance of nationalities, which were but the visible effect of their government. Similarly, monotheism involves as its normal expression, world-monarchy; which in turn must bring peace, since wars only occur between separate nations. The pax romana was thus simply identified with the pax messianica. Roman civilization was to absorb and homogenize the variety of cultures and tongues, brought into the world by the spiritual Principalities at the confusion of Babel. As the Logos conquered the powers of heaven, so his vice-regent, the Emperor, conquers the nations of the earth.

Such was to be the theory of Byzantium and the Holy Empire. Over against it stands the contrary position, adopted by Origen, for whom the perfect fulfilment of world-unity is a matter of eschatology; now, and for the rest of time, this unification is realized only in the Church, which knows no frontiers within itself, but co-exists with a world of national autonomies. The dispossessed Powers retain until the Second Coming a certain measure of influence. There will always be this contrast between the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the world, because in the current provisional phase of human development the separation of nations and cultures remains an integral feature of the natural order.

* * *

Speech-barriers, like national frontiers, are to be reckoned as belonging to the fallen state of mankind, not to the primordial destiny of the race; the obscure stirrings of an urge towards unification have, in this sense, the quality of nostalgia. But it is no less true that the distinction of tongues has its origin in the will of God. This condition of society is appropriate to the intrinsic requirements of man as he is, providing a natural medium well suited to his limitations. In this matter as in others it is dangerous to ignore the balance of nature. There must always be something equivocal about any human attempt to restore an effective linguistic unity of mankind: it is a sort of parody of the original Paradisal unity, and is apt to incur a chastisement. God alone can bring mankind together again in one people, but that ideal is not for this world any more: it belongs to the renewal of mankind in the heavenly Paradise; its fulfillment awaits the end of time, when men 'from all nations and tribes and peoples and languages'[58] shall praise the Lamb with one voice. Yet there is already a mysterious beginning of the ultimate unification, through Christ who has already opened Paradise to men. The sign of this unity was given at Pentecost, the antitype of Babel, when the Apostles, 'filled with the Holy Spirit, . . . began to speak in strange languages', and the multitude 'from every country under heaven . . . was in bewilderment; each man severally heard them speak in his own language'.[59]

At Babel, the confusion of tongues signified the fragmentation of mankind through sin: the restitution to the human race, through Christ, of unity in the Spirit was tangibly signified when men were enabled to understand each other again. But this was only in a figure. The new unity of mankind remains a hidden reality. 'We are sons of God even now', says St John, but 'what we shall be hereafter, has not been made known as yet.'[60] The Church is the outward and visible sign of this unity; the common liturgical languages, Latin, Greek, Old Slavonic, represent it in the linguistic field: but the life of men is none the less conditioned by the confusion of tongues. The victory over sin has been won, but the consequences of sin, whether death and disease or speech-barriers, will not be destroyed until the resurrection day.

It is now possible to define the distinctively Christian position in face of this complex of questions, from speech barriers to internationalism. The Christian believes that the final achievement of linguistic and political unification is a matter of eschatology; he finds something sacrilegious in every imperialistic or syncretizing programme of standardization or Gleichschaltung: but this does not require him to adopt an attitude of passive resignation towards the hermetic sealing-off of communication between the peoples of the earth, each isolated in its private world. This, for a Christian, would be an impossible dereliction of responsibility: his creed, on the contrary, includes belief in one fellowship of man; but not in an external uniformity that would abolish distinctions ordained by Providence. The Christian notion is of a community, in which every member is the complement of the others, and they of him.

The existence of civilizations altogether unlike our own is thus by no means something to be resented, or extinguished as far as possible by the imposition of a Western way of life. On the contrary, we have to recognize our own essential need of such a complement to our system. Nothing could be more unintelligent than insularity. The full beauty of mankind would be diminished by the loss of China's distinctive contribution, or that of the Arabs or the Negroes. Every race and every tongue gives expression to some irreplaceable aspect of humanity. Each language, in particular, has its own genius, its special capacity for handling certain ideas. For Christianity, this means that the one Gospel message, transmitted through the diversity of cultures as through a prism, reveals more adequately first one and then another of its perfections. The Church is that Bride, clothed in 'her robe of golden cloth, a robe of rich embroidery;' [61] the Church takes up the best in every civilization, to consecrate them all to the Blessed Trinity.



 

CHAPTER FOUR


EXILE AND HOSPITALITY

FORCIBLE transfers of populations are one of the most shocking symptoms of the cruelty of the modern world. We have seen Hitler's Germany uprooting the Jews of Poland from their homeland, and removing them to concentration camps; Stalin's Russia substituting Slav colonists for German natives in East Prussia; and Israel driving nearly a'million Arabs out of their own villages to make room for Zionist immigrants. In every country nowadays there will be found colonies of exiles or refugees, whether from Lithuania, perhaps, or Armenia, or Russia, or elsewhere, living among -- or rather, beside -- the inhabitants of their temporary resting-place, reproducing in our own time the kaleidoscopic spectacle of the folk-migrations of antiquity.

These racial shifts appear new and strange to us only because they have begun to disrupt the superficial tranquillity of a world whose peoples seemed to be settled, even embedded, in their peculiar habitations. But from a remoter point of view, as in the perspective of biblical ideas, the modern phenomenon is only an acute phase of the permanent instability of mankind; while the more inflexible structures of civilization are seen as a fragile top-crust, like the thin layer of solid lava on the surface of a volcano. The events of the present generation are symptomatic of the fundamental condition of fallen man, which is a state of dispersal. We have tried to regain the benefits of a homeland in the rigid mould of nation-states -- the fractures appearing in the mould remind us that we are all really stateless persons, sojourners: we rediscover no less than the basic truth about our life on earth, through these crimes of contemporary society.

In the Bible, as we have already seen, the fragmentation of mankind into nationalities is recognized as a feature of the condition of life under sin. It is described as a consequence of the particular sin of Babel. Hence, immediately, that ambivalent quality in the situation, which points to the inward mystery of the phenomenon of deportations.

On one hand, the existence of separate nations is something that has been ordained; God 'divided the nations apart . . . giving to each people its own home'. [62] From this point of view, forcible expatriations run counter to the ways of Providence. Though it is no part of the primordial destiny of man that he should take root in a particular soil, this is nevertheless an integral characteristic of the lot decreed by God for sinful man. The balance of nature is not to be disturbed with impunity. Any policy of internationalism based upon the theories of the unity of science, or upon the religion of humanity, must incur the sentence passed upon the men of Babel; for it implies idolatry, and a rejection of the divinely-established order. Such a policy, seeking to reconstitute through human means the sort of unity that God alone can bestow, necessarily achieves nothing but disturbance and chaos. In this world, nation-states represent the normal framework of human existence. So too, mass deportations are not only inhuman, but also a direct infringement of God's law, violating 'the homes of each people' that were given by God himself when he put his angels in charge of the nations of men. This is the formal guilt of all who commit these crimes: for they break one of God's commandments, in violently removing men from the places and homes which it has pleased God to give them. This was the sin of the kings of Babylon, who took the people of Israel away from the land the Lord gave them, leading them captive to the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates: and Babylon fell under a curse for breaking the commandment. 'On all the gentiles that fell to and feasted on lands of mine, marked them down for pillage, my jealous love pronounces doom.' [63] And finally, these deportations are not only a wickedness in their perpetrators, but also a great evil to the sufferers. Once they have been torn away from their natural environment, they become a proletariat, a restless factor of unrest, a corrosive solvent of all established order.

Yet this brutal disruption of the normal conditions of human life, wicked and dangerous as it is, may be the occasion of an even greater good. It is true that the spiritual activity of mankind must be exercised, as a general rule, within the context of a patria, but this natural frame of reference can also be a barrier. The deeper a man's roots lie in his native land, the more easily he may forget that patriotism is a secondary and conditional virtue, while essentially his most intimate allegiance is common to all humanity. Deportation, removing him from the home of his earthly fathers, may lead him to a clearer understanding of the fact that he has here no continuing city: 'our spirits are exiled from the Lord's presence so long as they are at home in the body'. [64] So the anonymous second-century author of the Epistle to Diognetus found a wonderful formula for the Christian attitude: 'Every foreign country is a home to them, but they are foreigners in every man's country' (V: 5). Wheresoever he may be exiled or deported, the Christian man finds his true home in the Christian fellowship, the figure of his heavenly fatherland: and even when he is settled in the land of his fathers, he knows that this is not where he finally belongs. But in case he might forget it, the experience of these mass-deportations is there to recall to mind his highest destiny, by showing the fragility of all the rest.

This salutary example is pointed out, in the Bible, through the story of the Babylonish captivity. The Prophets, first of all, gave the theological interpretation of this event as a punishment for the sins of the chosen people: 'Strange that this people of mine should forget me, and resort to vain sacrifices . . . I will sweep them away . . . as the east wind sweeps all before it.' [65] But this was not all: at the same time, Jehovah broke the ties which bound the hearts of his people to their earthly promised land, so as to awake in them the expectancy of spiritual possessions. This idea finds expression in closely related passages of Deuteronomy and Jeremiah: 'the Lord will make an end of you, scattering you over the world, and leaving but a few of you to live in a land of exile. . . . There, if thou wilt have recourse to the Lord thy God, if thou wilt but have recourse to him with all thy heart, in the bitterness of thy tribulation, thou wilt find him again.' [66] 'So the day shall dawn, the time be ripe at last . . . when Israel and Juda both together shall come back, weeping as they hasten on their journey to find the Lord their God . . . they will come back, and bind themselves to the Lord by an eternal covenant, never to be forgotten.' [67]

Even this does not exhaust the potential gains of the Captivity. There is a remarkable passage in Tobit, showing how the deported Jews were to be apostles of Jehovah, so that the captivity appears as a mission -- the means of making known among the heathen the name of the Lord: 'if he has dispersed you among heathen folk who know nothing of him, it was so that you might tell them the story of his great deeds, convince them that he, and no other, is God all-powerful.' [68] Thus, by a strange reversal, the crime of forcible expatriation becomes a positive source of spiritual value. In the first generations of Christianity, the missionaries were sometimes Christian slaves, or soldiers, displaced persons in effect, who brought about the conversions of their masters; but going further still, there have been missionaries who chose to go into exile of their own free will, to bear witness to Christ in foreign lands -- as the Irish and Anglo-Saxons did in the Dark Ages, or the French colonists in Canada in the seventeenth century, or the lay missionaries of our own day.

Nevertheless, though exile may be productive of good, even though it may be freely chosen as a mode of the apostolate, the fact remains that the dispersal of mankind is one of the consequences of sin: mankind is essentially one community. On the other hand, this union which is required by the nature of man is something other and more than any alliance or federation of states, or any scientifically designed supra-national collectivity. Its realization is in the gathering together of all men in Christ at the last day, when the primordial unity of mankind shall be restored. This is the condition of life for which man was created, before the dispersal of the nations; but it cannot be re-established through human resources, or for human ends. It consists in the order of the communion of saints, whose brotherhood comes from one common paternity. St John, in one of the very few passages of the New Testament that refer to the subject, declares how the restoring of unity depends upon Christ's cross: 'Jesus was to die . . . not only for that nation's sake, but so as to bring together into one all God's children, scattered far and wide.' [69]

Thus. while individual historians are free to put their own gloss on the phenomenon of deportations, we may stand by the view that it represents one distinctive element in the mysterium, the inwardness, of contemporary historical development; and that those responsible are but blind tools in the hands of God, who 'moves in a mysterious way' to produce unsuspected good out of obvious evil. The Jewish people, says Butterfield, 'provides us with a remarkable example of the way in which the human spirit can ride disaster and wring victory out of the very extremity of defeat. We have had an opportunity in recent years of picturing to ourselves the chilling horrors associated with the displacement of populations, and some of us may have made for ourselves a vision of such a tribulation as almost a kind of living death. Such things apparently took place amongst the grim empires of the ancient world, to the cruelty of which our own world has been fast reverting. Yet . . . the Old Testament people . . . showed that by resources inside themselves, they might turn their very catastrophe into a spring-board for human achievement.'

In the measure in which the deportations of our own time have reproduced some of the conditions of the ancient Völkerwanderungen, so they have re-introduced the currency of the ideal of hospitality -- the very counterpart of that social instability in which we live. Now this whole question of hospitality is something which the Christian West (to put it bluntly) cannot face. I recall the experience of a Chinese pilgrim, who made his way from Pekin to Rome on foot. The nearer he came, unfortunately, the less hospitality he found. In Central Asia there was no trouble at all; his journey through the Slavonic territories was fair enough: but once he got into the Latin countries he had, as they say, 'had it'. Here is a somewhat painful reminder that our Western Christian world is rather deficient in this particular virtue at the present time.

Yet hospitality, apart from all other considerations, is a priceless human asset. The Greeks recognized it as one of the criteria of civilization, so that, from one point of view, the measure of a community's approach towards a fully civilized polity was given by the theory and practice of hospitality maintained therein. Some idea of the real value of the moral achievement represented by the very notion of hospitality may be gathered from the curious fact that many languages have only one root for the words 'guest' and 'enemy'. The two categories have as their common basis the single undifferentiated notion of 'stranger' or 'foreigner', the outsider, not belonging to the same tribe or race, not a member of the same social or biological group;p such a one may either be enemy or guest. It is thus a triumph of civilization, or even the supreme triumph of civilization, to have made a foreigner a guest instead of an enemy; for this is essentially the brotherhood of man. Before this step was taken, packs of men were at war with one another, like the wild creatures in the primeval forests. From the moment when a stranger is taken in as a guest, no longer an object of execration but one of peculiar respect, a new thing has come into the world.

I have spoken of linguistic roots, and must now give my references: in Latin, a guest is hospes, while an enemy is hostis; the two words have a common ancestry. An hotel in German is Gasthaus, gast representing the same root. These observations are highly significant, because philology records the development of society. The Greek word for 'stranger' or 'foreigner', ξένος, may be used pejoratively, as in 'xenophobia', but also in the contrary sense of 'guest'; 'hospitable' in Greek is Άιλόξενος, 'loving strangers'. No doubt the same kind of development can be traced in other linguistic systems as well as in the Indo-European group.

The primordial condition of the 'outsider' is described in the tragic words of Cain, at the dawn of human history: 'I shall . . . wander over the earth, a fugitive; anyone I meet will slay me.' [70] The normal, appropriate reaction, on finding a refugee, a wanderer, an outlandish man, is to kill him. To take him in instead, as a guest and a godsend, is, simply, revolutionary. It will be of interest to notice the workings of this revolution within two great cultural systems from which our own civilization is derived -- the Greek and the Semitic.

Taking the Greeks first, their exalted conception of the value of hospitality dates from a remote period of history, as may be seen from the wonderful passages devoted to hospitality in the Homeric poems and especially in the episode of Ulysses, on his return to Ithaca, arriving home in the guise of a stranger, and being taken in as a guest by the swineherd Eumaeus, and by Penelope. Here we may recognize the theme of the mysterious guest who is something more than he seems: the unknown visitor, whose identity will eventually be declared, as a superabundant recompense to his hosts.

On another plane, there is a paragraph in the Laws of Plato, about the status of guests in Greek society, which is one of the fundamental texts for any understanding of the Hellenic culture. Plato has dealt with the mutual obligations of his citizens, and turns to the subject of foreigners:

as regards the alien, we must remember that compacts have a peculiar sanctity; indeed, offences by alien against alien, we may say, compared with sins against fellow-citizens, more directly draw down the vengeance of God. For the alien, being without friends or kinsmen, has the greater claim on pity, human and divine. . . . What anxious care, then, should a man of any foresight take to come to the end of life's journey guiltless of offence towards aliens. [71]

To read a text like this is to understand what the Greeks understood by Άιλοξενία, hospitality, namely that all men whatsoever are worthy of respect. It is, furthermore, to understand the meaning of civilization, namely that state of human life in which individual man is accorded his due of respect and of love, being loved the more in proportion as he may be defenceless, lonely, or unlucky. Thus it appears that any condition of society in which the contrary applies, where weaklings and outsiders are undervalued, discarded, or liquidated, is not civilized at all, whatever its degree of technological achievement. We must be clear about civilization, that it is not a function of material progress, but a stage in the emergence of humanity: and hospitality is one of the oldest and most reliable tests of humanity.

The Semitic peoples, and particularly the Arabs, share this tradition with the ancient Greeks: it is a commonplace that their inherited customs of hospitality are sacrosanct for them above all others. The Bedouin of the desert treat their guests as their ancestors did in the second and third millennia B.C. Once a man, even an enemy, has set foot in the threshold of their tents, he is a guest, something sacred: the fellowship of hearth -- and still more the fellowship of board -- is enough to bestow this special quality, so that any manner of violence or contumely that might be offered him would be a kind of sacrilege. It was even so in the tragic story of Sodom in the Bible, when an angel in human shape was taken in by the Sodomites, and then exposed to threats of infamous treatment: the divine punishment of destruction fell upon the city that thus offended against the law of hospitality. For the reverse of the picture, the due practice of this virtue, it is impossible not to recall another passage of Scripture, describing the conduct of Abraham in the plains of Mamre -- a passage which corresponds to the narrative of the homecoming in the Odyssey. 'He had a vision of the Lord, too, in the valley of Mambre, as he sat by his tent door at noon. He looked up, and saw three men standing near him; and, at the sight, he ran from his tent door to meet them, bowing down to the earth. Lord, he said, as thou lovest me, do not pass thy servant by; let me fetch a drop of water, so that you can wash your feet and rest in the shade. I will bring a mouthful of food, too, so that you can refresh yourselves before you go on further' [ Gen. 18: 1-5]. Then we see Abraham hastening to Sarah in the tent, for three measures of meal; running to the byre, to fetch a calf, and giving it to his servant, 'who made haste to cook it'. When all was prepared, 'he stood there beside them in the shade of the trees' while they ate.

The actions of Abraham, bowing down before his guests, washing their feet, giving them bread to eat and milk to drink, embody the immemorial outward expressions of hospitality. Washing the feet, as the first service to be rendered to a guest, has been adopted into the Christian liturgy of Maundy Thursday; and in the ancient rites of Baptism all the ceremonies that follow the administration of the sacrament itself seem to constitute a pattern of hospitality -the feet of the new Christian were washed, his head was anointed with oil, milk and honey were set before him. Along with water for the way-worn feet, and with the sharing of food and drink, the application of unguents to refresh the weather-beaten, sunburnt head and face was one of the sacramental rites of hospitality. The liturgy makes use of these simple actions, just as they were practised in the beginnings of the Hebrew civilization, to signify the supreme hospitality of the divine host receiving a stranger into his Church.

Christianity has thus consecrated these ancient practices, by conferring upon them a quasi-sacramental status; but this is not all: Christianity has also developed and transformed the very spirit of hospitality, and brought it to a new perfection. In the earliest ages of the Church, great importance was attached to hospitality as one of the essential Christian virtues. (It had to be said, earlier in this chapter, that the absence of hospitality in the modern so-called civilized world is proof of a real want of civilization: in the same way, if contemporary Christians are inhospitable, their Christianity can hardly be more than skin-deep.)

Among the early Christians, hospitality was not merely a private virtue, but a feature of the public life of the organized hierarchical community. The bishops who governed the churches were required, among other things, to be actively hospitable: this was already mentioned in the First Epistle to Timothy -- 'A bishop, then, must be one with whom no fault can be found; faithful to one wife, sober, discreet, modest, well behaved, hospitable'[72] ; and again in the second century, by the popular Roman writer Hermas, when he speaks of the trees giving shelter to the sheep, in his symbolic description of the Church: these are 'hospitable bishops, who have gladly at all times received into their houses the servants of God without hypocrisy'. [73] This was then a regular feature of the Primitive Church: any Christian stranger would find hospitality awaiting him in every parish -- or bishopric, for in those days the bishop corresponded rather with our idea of an average parish priest, not even the rector of a big metropolitan parish, who might have been an archbishop. The traveller had only to find the bishop to be taken in, 'gladly, without hypocrisy'. It must be emphasized that this early Christian hospitality was strictly an institution, maintained by the whole body of the Church under the superintendence of its local ruler. In modern times, we compound for this obligation through the establishment of 'hospices' or 'hostels', which have come to be nothing but a kind of 'hotel', with a charge for admission, organized on an economic basis. The debasement of the word 'hotel' is an indication of what has become of the idea of 'hospitality'. We could profit, in this field, by the example of our Protestant brethren, whose Salvation Army, for instance, does a great work: an institution like their rescue homes for girls bears effective witness to the true Christian ideal of hospitality.

And there are two sides to this question, for hospitality involves a receiving as well as a giving, and this exchange of values is an aspect of the communion of saints: it means opening and broadening the narrow circles in which we live and move, establishing channels of human communication, through which the life-giving spirit of Christ may freely flow. Thus we cannot fulfil our obligations merely by taking in strangers who come our way: we must sometimes be strangers ourselves in the way of others. This is the link between hospitality and the mission. The early Christian missionary, who had forsaken everything for the Gospel's sake, lived on the hospitality of his hearers, to whom in return he gave the good news entrusted to him: 'When you enter a house, say first of all, Peace be to this house . . . Remain in the same house, eating and drinking what they have to give you . . . and tell them, The kingdom of God is close upon you.' [74]

These words reveal the true significance and inwardness of hospitality, which had been adumbrated even among the pagans, in the figure of the stranger who came to Ithaca and proved to be other than he seemed; and again in Abraham's guests, who were really angels. So in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the first Christians were exhorted: 'do not forget to shew hospitality; in doing this, men have before now entertained angels unawares.' [75] As with Abraham, the stranger-guest may turn out to be an angel. There is always a mystery about him, for he is the unknown -except that we Christians now do know, since Jesus has told us, that he is always Jesus. We are told that in the last judgement, Jesus will say to the blessed: 'I was a stranger, and you brought me home', and they will say: 'When was it that we saw thee a stranger, and brought thee home?' and the King shall answer: 'When you did it to one of the least of my brethren here, you did it to me.' [76] Elsewhere in the Gospel he says: 'He who gives you welcome, gives me welcome too; and he who gives me welcome gives welcome to him that sent me'; [77] and again, according to St John, 'the man who welcomes one whom I send, welcomes me; and the man who welcomes me, welcomes him who sent me.' [78] So we receive Jesus in each of our guests, always and only Jesus. He has identified himself for ever as the guest, the stranger in this world who knocks at our door: 'See where I stand at the door, knocking; if anyone listens to my voice and opens the door, I will come in to visit him, and take my supper with him, and he shall sup with me.' [79]

The mystery of hospitality is thus seen to consist in an inversion of values: the real gainer is the host rather than the guest. The exercise of hospitality is itself a blessing, a grace. A household at Benares reckons it an honour to take in any pilgrim or devotee, young or old, among the voluntary mendicants who live on hospitality alone: when they come begging a handful of rice for the daily meal, they are made welcome with every mark of the kindest respect. The Christian conception is even more exalted, as may be seen in that faithful mirror of primitive tradition, the Rule of St Benedict, the text in which we find perhaps the truest expression of early Christian hospitality: for there it is explicitly laid down that a guest be received as the Lord Jesus himself. Those of us who have ever knocked at the Black Monks' door, with or without previous notice, will know what real hospitality means, and what a 'guest house' should be.

In this world, Jesus is the guest we receive into our houses; but we know that he is also the host who will receive us in the end. Today, he is with us as a stranger: he comes among men and men receive him not. But in the end we shall be the strangers in another world; rounding the promontory of death, adventuring into uncharted places alone, with no friends and companions, no kith and kin to help us; then we shall know with a vengeance what it means to want a home. How will it feel, then, to hear a well-known voice saying to us: 'Come, you that have received a blessing from my Father . . . for . . . I was a stranger, and you brought me home'? And when we say: 'when was it that we saw thee a stranger, and brought thee home?' he will reply: 'when you did it to one of the least of my brethren here, you did it to me.' If we want the perfect host to take us into his eternal home when we come to knock at his door, he has told us himself what we have to do: we must be ready to open our own door to the earthly guests that come our way. That shows the value and importance of our hospitality -- it is simply the criterion that Jesus will use when he comes to judge us among the living and the dead: it is the key of paradise lost.

 


 

CHAPTER FIVE


MARXIST AND SACRAMENTAL HISTORY

IN former times, 'the Christian Missions' were exclusively concerned with propagating the gospel among such communities of men as were geographically outside those territories which had been evangelized already. But latterly there has come into existence a new kind of civilization, common to the whole human race, and alien from all the civilizations that have so far received the Gospel. The distinctive achievement of the nineteenth century, the fruit of technological advance and of the industrial society which this led to, was the establishment of new communities of men, standing outside all the old social categories, but themselves drawn together by an identity of conditions and interests, to constitute new urban collectivities around the towns and cities of the old world -- the working-class districts. For although the recent structural changes in society affect all mankind, their primary manifestation is in the workingclass, which owes its very existence directly to them.

The reaction to this new world has followed the pattern of reactions to the ancient non-Christian cultures. The first move was an attempt at colonization, an endeavour to annex and assimilate the workers to the constituted forms of bourgeois Christianity -- just as Christians once tried to impose their Western traditions upon the Far East. When this failed, as it was bound to do, efforts were made to start a Christian working-class movement, over against the secular working-class movement: but, as always happens, this only took in a fringe of the working-class; the core and the leadership were untouched. For Christianity to take root in any society, it must be embraced by the leaders, the accredited trustees of its ideals.

So we have eventually arrived at a third position, equally appropriate to the working-class world and to the Far East: a recognition that we must ourselves belong to a society, whatever its faults and failings, before we can think of implanting the Gospel in it. In the words of Albert Dominique:

The idea of any return to 'Christendom' (which is, in any case, a somewhat imprecise and mythical conception, constantly eroded by historical criticism) is going out of date: the Christian's aim is now rather to set about his business of being a man, in a true-hearted spirit of partnership with anyone who is trying to build a decent world for men to live in, and with a sincere respect for the worth and autonomy of human ideals. Words like 'conquest' imply the enrolment of the masses into Catholic organizations, or the growth of a Catholic party at the expense of other parties: instead of these words, there is a growing use of such significant expressions as 'gospel witness', 'missionary spirit', conveying the idea that a Christian's function is to 'be there', on the job.

This means that the problem of establishing Christianity on a solid basis in the working-class society of the future has at last been stated in adequate terms: the requirement is for authentically class-conscious workers, fully committed to the cause, and at the same time Christians. But the very definition points to the elements of tragedy in the situation of these working-class Christians, which is indeed the common lot of Christians in the world, only in an exceptionally acute form. For the working-class is, on the one hand, a moment in the creative process; it represents a valid ideal in conflict with obsolescent institutions, and as such fulfils God's purpose. But it is none the less a heathen society, worshipping a new idol, in place of the old gods of the Gentiles, namely man himself, exalted by the new discovery of his own quasi-creative power.

The Christian worker has, and must have, two loyalties: he cannot deny the claims of either. He must be true to his class, even though the working-class movement, as it exists in fact, is anti-Christian. But, within the movement he must keep clear of any complicity with its idolatrous tendencies. Without this absolute intransigence, which is required of him, his position is meaningless. The combination of these two attitudes in the working-class Christian may well be called incomprehensible, self-contradictory, or just impossible. But that is the way he has to be.

And after all, it is no wonder: for this is simply the Christian way of life, in the limiting case. Who ever supposed Christianity was a viable arrangement, except people who have grown accustomed to worshipping God and Mammon -- and what do they know of Christianity? The normal condition of Christians is described by St Paul: 'It seems as if God had destined us, his apostles, to be in the lowest place of all, like men under sentence of death; such a spectacle do we present to the whole creation, men and angels alike . . . we have no home to settle in, we are hard put to it, working with our own hands. Men revile us, and we answer with a blessing, persecute us, and we make the best of it. . . . We are still the world's refuse; everybody thinks himself well rid of us.' [80]

Such is the lot of every Christian, but particularly of the working-class Christian in our own day, who thus typifies the apostolic ideal. He is rejected on all hands -- by Christendom instinctively, because he is committed to a hostile movement; and by the Marxists, who will not indefinitely tolerate his deviations from their idolatry. 'Filth', 'offscouring', he is 'made a spectacle . . . to angels'; jetsam in the strongest cross-currents of a world in travail. He is a contradiction in terms, standing for something that does not exist in reality. His affirmation is meaningful only as a prophecy; but that is the point of it: he embodies the future. He asserts the impossible as a fact, for he is himself the rough draft of a Christian working-class society.  

He is in a position to make personal trial of the solidity of those working-class values, which are the preparation, as it were the toothing-work, for the building of Christianity in time to come. There are three experiences in particular, belonging to the working-class, the taste of which is enough to cure a man of bourgeois tendencies for good, on pain of treason against himself. The first is poverty -- not playing at poverty, as some Christians like to do, when they have something solid to fall back upon; but the pitiless insecurity of the wage-earner, 'haunted by the inexorable spectre of a gap between purchasing-power and the cost of living, obsessed by the fear of partial or complete unemployment, or of sickness in the family'. To live like that is to belong among the countless multitude of the world's poor: and 'the poor', as Fr Desroches expressed it, 'are the privileged objects of the Saviour's providence'. In the bowed figure of a Russian serf, Péguy discerned the tragic immemorial supplication of Oedipus; the invariable pattern of poverty embodying man's supreme acknowledgement of God.

Then there is the experience of a brotherhood of man. Bourgeois society is built upon a framework of lines of demarcation, whether between nations or between classes; but there is no longer anything in the realities of working-class life to correspond to these artificial divisions of mankind. This elimination of boundary-lines is a world-wide development: 'one integral feature of the modern unification of the globe is the emergence of a single world-wide proletariat, consisting of all the toiling masses of every race, colour, language, and type.' Here is another of the structural prefigurations of future Christianity. 'There is something providential in this development of a social homogeneity throughout the world, in parallel with the growth of a spiritual ideal of "one world". Our present generation faces a critical moment in the apostolic mission.'

Finally, the working-class, as such, is consciously transforming the life of the world. Our planet, as we know it today, is one vast building-site. 'The delicate equilibrium in man, between his involvement in the world of nature and his private personality, is shifting, under the pressure of conflicting developments on both sides; the human race is undergoing a painful mutation, with a sort of growingpains, as it were of adolescence or a sloughing-off of its old skin. The workers of the world are at the epicentre of an earthquake; they represent the lava-flow that issues from the eruptive activity of modern technology. The transformation of personality corresponding to the physical changes is represented by the working-class movement. There may be much exaggeration in the myth of a messianic proletariat, but there is no disputing the decisive influence of the working-class movement in shaping the future of civilization. Its essential functions are to ensure that the new world of the industrial revolution shall not be impropriated by any privileged caste, and to promote the interests of the great mass of mankind by raising the workers' standard of living in proportion to the progress of technical advance.'

Well: but these factors in the working-class situation, each of which intrinsically belongs to the Christian social order of the future, are also obstacles in the way of its accomplishment. The justifiable complaint of the wageearners against capitalist exploitation has been translated by Marx and his disciples into a denial of all transcendental authority, which was considered to be a form of exploitation, simply because the truths of religion were regarded as standing or falling with their associated social structures. The unity of the working-class is in competition with the unity of Christendom: 'It must be acknowledged that Communism has taken the lead, in many parts of the world, in promoting the ideal of workers' solidarity' -- an advantage which it is not slow to realize. And the very consciousness of man's new powers and enlarged field of control in the physical universe has resuscitated the temptation to be 'as gods', to create mankind anew merely by altering the material conditions of human existence.

The class-conscious worker who is also a Christian has to live in the point of intersection of these contrasts -- he must always be on both sides of the fence at once. In this position he exactly reproduces the situation of the Primitive Church among the heathen. The Constantinian phase of Christian history is coming to an end: the old Christian world, or worldly Christianity, is breaking up under the irresistible pressure of new and vital forces. The Christians who see this most clearly are those who bear the heat and burden of the workers' day: they feel a much closer affinity with the early Church than with medieval Christendom or with the Age of Reason. Albert Dominique brought out this point in the article from which I have been quoting: 'Equally significant is the strong appeal of the first period of Christianity, the centuries before the growth of Cesaropapist ideas, and the persistent attraction of biblical and liturgical origins.' And this also furnishes the complete explanation of something else, a development which I take to be peculiarly characteristic of our own time, namely the re-entry of contemplatives into the active life of the world. For in the early days of Christianity, the holy virgins and the men of prayer lived their daily lives as part of the one Christian community in full contact with the world of paganism. The flight into the desert was a revolutionary innovation, dating from the fourth century, when St Anthony inaugurated the age of monks, the withdrawal of the contemplatives from a world in which Christianity was compromised, into the solitudes where they might keep alive the faith of the martyrs. That age is passing -- St Anthony is coming back from his desert; there is no need for flight now that the Church is once again an army of martyrs, in the midst of a heathen society. 'My factory is my desert.'

For a Christian who has to live among men whose preoccupations, under Marxist influences, are exclusively materialistic, the main difficulty will be to preserve his faith in moral and spiritual values. Marxism interprets the historical process as a transformation of mankind through economic change. The social mechanism of progress is classwar: the rising class, which conforms to the economic infrastructure of the future, struggles to displace the exploiting class, which belongs to an earlier state of the economy. In order to exist, a man must take part in this struggle, he must be engaged in the historical process. And the Christian answer to all this is too often only an inverted copy of Marxist social doctrine. For want of any serious analysis of the authentic Christian solution of the question on the spiritual plane, the debate is conducted in Marxist terms.

But the right answer, as we understand the matter, should be sought from the other end, in the dedicated life of Christianity, especially through the sacraments: there is no reason why Christians should feel like refugees whenever they practise their religion; on the contrary, they are then in the vanguard of the historical process. To prove our point, we will examine a series of situations showing (despite all preconceived probability) that the highest and deepest supernatural aspects of Christian life, and in particular the sacraments, furnish the best solution of contemporary problems. Thus it will appear that these eternal realities, far from being a side-issue, belong to the innermost structure of our life in the world: practising Christianity is not merely an optional arrangement to secure good relations with almighty God, but means committing oneself utterly, and for good.

The modern mind is habituated to an evolutionary, or historical, conception of reality. This universal attitude is partly due to the rapid growth of human knowledge, which has automatically familiarized us with the notion of progress, and partly to the scientific recovery of the pre-history of mankind. No system of thought which fails to take account of the time-process, as one of its dimensions, will survive criticism today. If Hegel was the first to give philosophical form to this attitude of mind, it has been increasingly fortified since his time, and particularly by the Marxists.

But the Marxist formulation of the position is curiously restrictive. The basic idea of Marxism is that history consists in a dialectical process whereby man creates himself -- that is, progressively attains to the full stature of humanity, by successive changes in the economic conditions of his existence. Consequently the men who really count, the heroes of modern history, are the scientists and the manual workers: poets, artists, philosophers and saints rank lowers; they are not, in the Marxist system, indispensable -- as the scientist is, for the methods of material progress, and the worker, for its achievement. It is obviously a stimulating doctrine for these two categories of people, that they are the essential factors in history-making: that history really consists of a succession of industrial processes -- the Iron Age, the ages of fire, steam, electricity, or atomic energy -- that everything else is only superstructure. The whole mechanism of human progress is comprised in the techniques of production, and the improvement of these techniques is the only way to a better world.

The compulsive force of this position comes from the fact that it is not simply an intellectual account of reality presented for men's acceptance, but invites an engagement of the will by exhibiting a morally valid reason for activism. The system is not just a brute materialism, but a kind of humanism; its conception of mankind is certainly atheistic, but supremely exalted: it is in fact a religion, or cult, of man. As such it is the absolute contradiction of Christianity; it finds man's highest good in man himself; it posits man as his own creator. For a Marxist, any recognition of God represents a loss of human status and dignity, so that true humanism must be fundamentally godless.

In these circumstances it is quite useless for Christians to put forward any more or less half-hearted form of Christian humanism in competition with the Marxist doctrine.

Christian thought is always and inevitably at a disadvantage in this field, unless it holds fast to the essential principles of Christianity, which are the religious worship of God, and the recognition of God in history. The product of history, in the Christian view, is not only a certain social organization of mankind, but primarily mankind's fulfilment of God's will. Our only hope of defeating Marxism depends on our conviction that Christianity is the real maker of history. The crucial conflict in our time is between these two philosophies of history: for Christianity, like Marxism, is basically historical -- it is not at all, and never has been, a system of ideals to be superimposed on a different and more or less refractory world of real life. Its interpretation of the entire historical process is final.

The structural pattern of history, as the Christian understands it, is given by what is called Sacred History, that is, the temporal succession of works whereby Almighty God, the Creator, proceeds to the building of the eternal city of mankind. Thus the interpretation of Christian history requires more than an understanding of outward and visible events; it must take account of what happens in the hearts of men, which is revealed to us by the Holy Spirit -- and chiefly in the Scriptures, the chronicle of the mighty works of God, wherein his ways are made known to us, and the characteristics, so to say, of his creative policy and methods. Our discovery and comprehension of God's universe will be no more than proportionate to our acceptance and assimilation of the Holy Scriptures as containing the fundamental realities of life and truth.

The Bible starts with the historical record of creation, and proceeds to exhibit the continuous effect of God's action in the course of events. God makes choice of Abraham to be the Head of his people, and enters into a covenant with him. Thereafter, he guides his people in his own ways. But at once we find a new and important set of considerations: this sacred history which is accomplished through God's creative activity, stands in contrast with another kind of history that men would fashion for themselves (and leave available for Marxist research). All through the record, there are these two contrasting sequences. On the one hand, man's efforts at history-making through pride, ambition, the lusts of the flesh, a succession of empires and conquests, down to the struggles of our own generation between the rival great powers, each seeking to determine the course of human history: a bloody chronicle of war, persecution, and enslavement. Many people know no other meaning of the word 'history': but all the while God is making history in his own way, shaping the lives of men towards the establishment of his kingdom. The Old Testament furnishes us with a typical instance of this duality, in the narrative of conflict between the prophets -- representing the Christian conception of history, through the spiritual illumination whereby God revealed to them the reality of man's eternal destiny -- and the principalities and powers of this world by whom they were invariably persecuted.

At the nodal point of history, the Son of God himself became incarnate, came down to earth to take upon him the nature of mankind, purifying and perfecting it in his own person through the shedding of his precious blood, setting man free from death and sin, to inherit the Father's kingdom for ever. For it is indeed freedom that the human race requires, and release from the burden of captivity; but this enslavement is spiritual, not economic. Original sin is not capitalism, wrongly regarded by Marxism as the root of all evil: even if all mankind could be rid of poverty and oppression and economic distress, they would still be by nature the wage-slaves of sin. Marx was mistaken in thinking that when men were once delivered from economic bondage, the world would be happy; for the horrors of spiritual destitution remain. It may be that the people of Soviet Russia have achieved economic freedom, but the depth of their spiritual despair is unmistakable.

Thus the activism of the Marxists is superficial, it does not get to the roots of man's unease. It is certainly our duty to attack social wrong and economic distress, but these are only the symptoms of a more deep-seated evil, the work of the devil: and from this real captivity there is only one deliverer, Jesus Christ. The purport of history, according to Marxism, is the liberation of man; we would entirely agree, but add that it can only be achieved by Christ and his followers. Apostolic and contemplative souls are the real saviours of mankind. So long as we fail to appreciate this, so long as we are content with a social programme which is merely an alternative to communism, instead of following out into practice the essential principles of our religion, we cannot escape an inferiority complex. For us, social and economic policy is not the whole story: we have a deeper and more important concern, to further the work of Jesus Christ for the salvation of men.

Marxists, for their part, are not strictly obliged to deny the worth and beauty of historical Christianity, or to minimize its revolutionary consequences: but they maintain that its work is done, that the crisis of dissolution is upon it, that a new era has begun; mankind has progressed beyond Christianity towards a religion of the future. The Christian answer to this contemporary challenge is a confession of faith: there is no superseding Christ, he is the fulfilment of all things, he is Alpha and Omega, the last end of the world as he is the spring of its eternal youth. In him all things are made new, and the word 'beyond' has no meaning in relation to him who is the consummation of all. His coming is the completion of the human story; therefore we look for no progress, no development comparable in importance with that which we already possess in Jesus Christ. He has given us infinitely more than any technological advance or social revolution could offer.

The Marxist conception of history is open-ended: his preoccupations are with the future. For Christians, the structure of history is complete, and its decisive event, instead of coming last, occupies the central position. Nothing can ultimately go wrong. The acceptance of final justification and salvation as a gift, not as of our own making, is simply a reflexion, in the eschatological plane, of that sense of utter dependence which characterizes, and indeed constitutes the basis of, all religion. But this does not mean that we have no more to do; after the central, decisive event, the task remains of ensuring that all men come into effective possession of the gift once secured in principle for all mankind. Sacred history is thus also the history of our own time.

In this later current period of time the outstanding events are those of the sacramental life. This is something vastly more important than the achievements of modern thought, or the discoveries of science, or victorious wars, or successful revolutions, all which things make up the tissue of recorded history, but leave no trace at the deeper levels where real history is enacted. The greatness of these mighty works belongs to the intellectual and the physical world, but the mighty works of the spiritual world, in the order of charity, are the sacraments. ' Jesus Christ made no discoveries', wrote Pascal, 'but he was humble, patient, holy, holy in the sight of God, terrible to evil spirits.' For want of a thorough-going conviction of this truth, we are too easily apt to be impressed by intellectual and physical achievements, and to forget that we ourselves hold the secret of God's own plan of love. In our false sense of values we make to ourselves idols of the things men revere -- science, money, history, the State -though the first of the commandments is 'thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and serve none but him.' [81]

The working of God's power among us is through the sacraments. As we have seen, there is a worse captivity than the economic enslavement of the workers through capitalist exploitation: it is the captivity of men, 'slaves of sin', [82] and exploited by the powers of darkness. From this servitude the only deliverance is through holy baptism. Jesus Christ alone sets us free from the bondage of sin: Jesus Christ, who went down into the kingdom of death and sounded the depths of human suffering; Jesus Christ, who rose again, victorious over death and hell for ever, and opened up for all mankind the way of salvation. Baptism, in the words of St Paul, means dying with Jesus Christ in order to rise again with him, and reign with him for ever on the right hand of the Father. In the primitive liturgical context of the Paschal vigil, baptism is recognizably a continuation of the mighty works of God whereby he saved his people in the first Passover, from bondage in Egypt, and in the second Passover delivered his son from the bondage of hell. So, too, the third Passover, the Mass, not only commemorates but effectively continues the one reality of the former two.

The significance of baptism is not only a liberation, but a creation. St Paul calls it παλιγγενσία, [83] regeneration, 'a new Genesis'. In the beginning the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters, and there was brought forth in them the physical life of the first creation. The same Spirit, according to the Gospel, overshadowed Mary, that she, in the power of the Most High, might bring forth the world of the second creation, the world of grace, wherein men become sons of God; the world whose orientation is towards Christ, the eternal sun-rising. Baptism is this same new creation of every living soul. That which comes out of the stream of living water, 'water and the Spirit' [84] regenerated, new-begotten, born again in Christ, belongs thereafter to the new creation. In the Marxist myth, man is the demiurge of mankind, through a continuous 'creation' which consists in economic change. But just as Marxism is incapable of setting man free from the worst of his servitudes, so it cannot really produce a new kind of man, for Jesus Christ himself, 'the man who came afterwards', [85] is alone homo novissimus.



 

CHAPTER SIX


TEMPORAL WORKS AND THE MARXIST MYTH

GRANTED the data of the previous chapter, we have still to meet the question implied in the title of Father Montuclard book, Dieu pour quoi faire? 'Why God?' See the contemporary hardships of individuals and communities, between the disasters from which they have just escaped and those which already threaten their future -- is there nothing that Christianity can do to alleviate this tragedy, we ask? How can we be deaf to this cry? It is true that our Lord Jesus Christ refused to be accepted by the people as a magician, who should provide for the satisfaction of their temporal needs: yet, for all that, 'he had compassion on the multitude', and he did give them bread. The Christian's due recognition of eschatological values, his rightly exclusive concern with eternal salvation, can never make him callous or indifferent towards the sufferings of mankind in this world; this is the tragedy that moved Fr Montuclard, and moves us today.

There remains room, however, for an independent commentary on his solution of the problem, and particularly on what he has to say of the role of Christianity in the world of economic and social affairs. After showing, in his book, that Christianity is not designed to secure earthly benefits for us, but to admit us to a share in the divine mysteries, he continues: 'It is for us to plan the earthly paradise in which no man shall be exploited by another, it is for us to work towards this end, patiently, yet boldly, through an everincreasing understanding of the principles of sociological evolution and progress. At the present time, it is true, we cannot fully realize the ways in which human activity will be developed through the progress of sociology, scientific socialism, psychology, medicine, pedagogy, and the rest of the social sciences. But we can at least be sure of this, that we are promised a boundless hope.'

If we understand the author's argument correctly, this means that, apart from the saving of souls, there is an 'earthly paradise', 'a boundless hope', founded upon the extraordinary scientific extension of mankind's natural potentialities. In this 'boundless hope', there is included the possibility of a 'transformation of the life of man'. The prospect is open to Christians -- despite the communists, who exclude the eschatological dimension from their programme: that is their error; but the temporal prognosis is sound. The Christian parts company with the communists because of his belief in God, but he can share their belief in the capacity of mankind to transform itself. There are two distinct spheres of Christian action, which must be considered separately: in temporal affairs, the Christian is neither more nor less than a man among his fellow-men; but another field of operation is open to him as well, in the life of the spirit.

This solution of our problem is admittedly attractive at first sight. We all know the kind of Christian socialism that claims to produce the Christian answers to social and economic questions, but in practice succeeds only in debasing Christianity to the level of a party programme (which does not work). From the weariness of spirit caused by such misdirected efforts, there is a real refreshment in going back to a proper discrimination of categories. It remains to be seen whether this discrimination itself has perhaps been imprudently exaggerated into a discontinuity: but the first point is worth making, namely that the Christian has both a spiritual calling, to await the world to come, and also a duty in this world to improve his brethren's lot.

Yet the notion of 'improvement' in this context still requires analysis. It may refer simply to the limited practical humanitarian measures we can take to alleviate the pressure of economic laws in the world as we know it. Christians have always played a part in this kind of work, just like other men, with more or less success. We are not in the habit of emphasizing this particular aspect of Christianity, and certainly we do not regard it as a thing of primary importance; but for what it is worth, the evidence is overwhelming, from medieval times onwards to the present day, and cannot honestly be disputed. Christian humanitarianism has suffered from a twofold limitation -- the want of effective zeal among Christians, and the resistances implicit in humanity itself.

Why is it so often said that Christianity does not work? 'You have been on the job for nearly two thousand years in this world: what is there to show for it?' -- so runs the familiar accusation. The results that we are alleged to have failed to achieve are something quite different in kind from the limited progress which, as suggested above, has actually been attained. It is a fact that mankind has become increasingly aware of human potentialities, especially during the last couple of centuries, the period in which scientific developments have most remarkably extended the scope of man's activity. This has gradually reinforced the visionary hopes of a radical change in the conditions of human existence, to be effected through a modification of the material circumstances of life. Hence the myth of man as his own demiurge, and the theory of an earthly paradise, a classless society, to be achieved by man through his own unaided efforts.

This is what is commonly understood today when people talk of an improvement in the lot of humanity as 'a boundless hope'. This is what Fr Montuclard appears to find perfectly compatible with Christian ideas, apart, of course, from the atheistic corollaries of its Marxist context, and without prejudice to the status of hope as a theological virtue. On this hypothesis it is fair to complain that Christianity does not work, because Christianity has not enabled man to recover the earthly paradise for himself. Fr Montuclard himself puts the crucial question, in another passage: 'How can you maintain that salvation, all salvation is through Christ alone, when you insist that Christians in the world must work for the material betterment of living conditions? This sort of progress is itself a form of salvation -- the salvation of mankind by man, over and beyond the salvation of mankind through Jesus Christ.'

That is exactly the point. All Christians agree in recognizing the reality of sacred history, which records the sequence of events in the salvation of men. On the other hand there is no denying, as a fact, the contemporary acceptance of a view of profane history, according to which the progress of technology, taking over from biological evolution, is in process of making man. How are these two forms of history related? Fr Montuclard starts by affirming that belief in progress 'affords to those who have no religious affiliations a kind of faith and hope, a certain conception of life and reality, which may be inchoate and dim, may fall short of any full understanding of the range and scale of what is involved, but which does nevertheless call for a measure of self-sacrifice and an exacting standard of conduct'. In short, faith in progress works like a rudimentary form of religion: but what is its essential significance for those who are Christians already? Fr Montuclard, who has the great distinction of being the first to analyse correctly this temporal development of sacred history, arrives at the following conclusion: 'The Church's main concern must be to recognize this species of history and to revitalize it from within, though God has begun to write it outside the Church, and without her visible or direct co-operation.'

There will be many to whom this solution of the problem must appear strangely optimistic and inadequate. Optimistic it is indeed. Belief in progress may in some cases represent, albeit improperly, an act of faith in the Absolute: but when, as in the case under discussion, it amounts to a positive dogma of 'salvation of mankind through man', surely we must recognize the essential negation of all religion -- the great distinctive heresy of modern times. Accordingly, another school of thought maintains that the religion of progress is actually the besetting sin of our generation, and the chief obstacle to conversion: technological man is intoxicated with the sense of his own power. Kraemer writes: 'It cannot be denied that the material progress achieved in modern civilization has entitled man to feel himself as it were the creator of his own world; but the first consequence of this instinctive reaction has been restrictive: the history and the life of mankind are regarded as exclusively immanent, wholly explicable in human terms.' Marxism is the precise formula of this intuition of a creative humanity, so understood as to exclude all transcendent activity or influence. In Kraemer's penetrating words, again, 'what makes the situation apparently hopeless is not so much the bankruptcy of man in his projects for a new society and a new world, but his stubborn refusal to acknowledge failure'. The sickness of the modern world does not consist in its recurrent political and economic crises, which are merely symptomatic, but in its obsessive idolatrous persuasion of self-sufficiency.

Gabriel Marcel has explored the metaphysics of this delusive pretension. He observes, first, that technology is itself morally indifferent and cannot be regarded as inherently wrong -- 'a condemnation of Technique would be meaningless verbiage'. He then proceeds to show that what is wrong is 'the transition from Technique itself to the sacrilegious attitude that makes an idol of it. Along this line of analysis it will appear that the primary deviation into idolatry determines a further step down into autolatry, self-worship'. Here Marcel confirms Kraemer: the danger of the cult of technological progress lies in its tendency to restrict and confine mankind within the adoring contemplation of his own creative power. Thus technology may lead to a substitution of the means for the end, losing sight of 'the irreducible, inviolate mystery of Being'. Technique, in itself a thing indifferent, neither good nor evil, becomes a 'technique of sin'.

It follows unquestionably that the religion of progress and the dogma of 'salvation of mankind through man', so far from being a rudimentary form of real faith, is on the contrary the real sin of our contemporary world. When people talk of 'efficiency', if they mean the production of results commensurate with the idea of progress so understood, then indeed Christianity is not 'efficient', does not work: but that is because this kind of 'efficiency' does not exist. It is only by a hoax on the grand scale that a vast number of our contemporaries have been brought to believe in the real possibility of an earthly paradise, and consequently to accept the suggestion that a religious system which falls short of any such promise is a failure -- 'does not work'. What is extraordinary is that appreciable numbers of professing Christians are ready to endorse this idea; for, indeed, the conception of 'efficiency' that underlies it is the most obvious nonsense, and Christianity is well advised to have no part in it: the special distinction of our religion is a rigid refusal to deceive mankind -- it is better to forgo the prospect of proselytes than to feed men with lying promises. That is not to say that Christianity rejects the idea of a transfiguration of mankind, body and soul, and of the whole creation: on the contrary, Christianity is obstinately optimistic -- but this is in respect of God's intervention, and on the eschatological planes the Christian hope is not of this world, because the essential definition of the Christian life is in terms of transition from one stratum of being to another.

The scope of progress in this world must always be limited. Christians are undoubtedly obliged to work for the betterment of the conditions of human existence, and against the common disasters of sickness, war, and want.

But on the one hand, mankind itself opposes against these efforts the blank wall of finite human nature as it is, with all its innate predetermined and ambivalent tendencies: there is no panacea for moral disorders and for the misery they lead to. Death itself may be deferred by the aid of scientific discoveries, with no better result than the indefinite prolongation of human misery -- as Simone de Beauvoir pointed out in Tous les hommes sont mortels. And in any case there is, on the other hand, an unwarranted pre-supposition in all theories of a new earthly paradise, namely that the machinery of economic and social progress will be employed in beneficial directions: whereas Christians know that sin will last as long as the world lasts, and that human history will always wear two faces. Indeed there is reason to fear that what is in prospect for us may be a more dreadful earthly inferno, seeing the equivalent potentiality of evil in all the elaborations of science.

What is wrong with the 'boundless hope' of humanity, the chief defect of it -- in spite of its capacity to evoke the sort of generous, even heroic, response which understandably makes a profound impression on Fr Montuclard -- is its radical unreality. The Marxists call Christianity a hoax, but they are themselves the hoaxers. The real 'opium of the people', distracting men's minds from their essential task, is the communist myth of an earthly paradise: because this orientation of working-class action towards a world revolution, with promise of a perfect classless society, necessarily involves the neglect of all the limited objectives, towards which -- alone -- human efforts may be effectively directed, the practical alleviation of remediable distress and the righting of corrigible wrongs. This is the 'idealism' rightly classed by Sartre as a worthless hypocrisy -- throwing away, for the sake of and in the name of a meaningless ideological cause, all the limited, but real and realizable, fruits of practical work.

Even so, this is not the whole story. Certainly we must first get rid of the illusion that Christianity is a means of obtaining earthly happiness. Christianity does not make a perfect world; no one can, for there is no such thing. The tragedy of the world's pain and sorrow is still there, a pain and sorrow that cannot be altogether done away, since it is all part of the present state of human existence; not indeed 'man's lot' essentially, as Sartre wrongly held, but his present lot. Yet this pain and sorrow can be alleviated in some degree. After all, Christ himself did give the multitudes bread to eat in the desert. So the question remains, whether our faith in God is relevant to this human task.

Once again, it is not the purpose of our religion to improve the standard of living; but there is an influence of religion on social ethics. I am not referring to the secular activities of Christian people, but to the effects of religious faith as such. As a matter of simple fact, the civilizing consequences of Christianity have not been achieved through any turning aside from spiritual concerns in order to attend to material things; on the contrary, they came about because Christianity was true to itself. Christianity has not abolished the relationship between master and man, or put an end to wars these matters lie outside its scopes but the incontestable fact remains, that wherever Christianity has been solidly established it has helped to make slavery impossible, to improve the worker's lot, and to create a comity of nations. The discontinuity of the religious and secular planes is not such as to preclude the possibility of interaction. It is right to insist on the difference between the natural and supernatural orders, but it is also true that nothing is outside the order of Providence.

The influence of the Christian religion upon civilization has not completely transformed the structure of social life, but that is because, as we have repeatedly urged, such a transformation is nothing but a myth. The effectiveness of human activity is limited by conditions which are outside human control. A proletarian revolution can secure the redistribution of the fruits of production; but it cannot alter the basic conditions of the means of production -- for example, it cannot simply abolish sub-standard conditions of underground employment in the mining industries, where progress depends on scientific developments, which will be no more rapid in a collectivist than in a capitalist society. The deceitful, lying aspect of Marxist communism is the suggestion that the social revolution will transform conditions of labour. In fact, the lot of the working-class is everywhere more or less alike: the nearest equivalent to the Russian labourer's life is the life of an American labourer.

What can be done is to make the existence of man more human, within the possible and practical limits of real life. In this context, there are certain identifiable human values, not peculiarly Christian, which nevertheless flourish only in a Christian setting, and tend to wither away when Christian influences are withdrawn. With the removal of Christianity, men lose their religion, but also in a measure their humanity. We should be the last to exaggerate the value and importance of the civilizing aspects of Christianity, especially in comparison with its essential other-worldly significance. And we are satisfied that non-Christian civilizations have their own values, which are not to be depreciated. But when we consider the universal constant work of civilization, which is the defence of mankind against necessity, or fate, we remain convinced that civilization's most reliable ally is Christianity, though the essential purpose of Christianity is something entirely different..

Even so, this does not exhaust the function of the Church in the matter of history-making. The formula we quoted earlier, from the pen of Fr Montuclard, would suggest that history belongs to human society, while the Church, as a supra-temporal institution, acquires historical status only by reason of its socialization. But Christianity itself is historic; indeed, the historical approach to reality was originally a Christian discovery; and even today, it is only in virtue of Christian presuppositions that history can attain to its proper standing, because Christianity alone represents a positive and irreversible increment. So it is true, as Fr Montuclard says, that Christianity must 'revitalize' the passing forms of civilizations as they come and go, making Christendoms of them: for 'Christendom' is not to be identified exclusively with medieval institutions, and Fr Montuclard's phrase about the 'retreat of the Church' since the Middle Ages reveals a complete misunderstanding of bourgeois Christianity in the ages of reason and enlightenment. That is one aspect of the Church in historyi but it is also true that Christianity is itself the archetype of the historical process, and imposes its own pattern on the development of civilization. It is this latter point that Fr Montuclard failed to bring out.

Thus secular history is taken up and assimilated into sacred history.

The whole of this development is of course something essentially secondary. Emmanuel Mounier shows a want of proportion when he defines the progress of the Church exclusively in terms of 'sanctifying the new shapes of the world'i and again when he accuses those who oppose a 'liturgical cosmos' to 'the scientific and rational cosmos' of confusing 'the eternal essence of the religious act' with 'outmoded forms of representation'. [86] Even those of us who are least disposed to set much store by the preservation of obsolete forms, may hesitate to believe that the introduction and substitution of new and living patterns in Christian worship, however desirable or necessary, makes up the whole matter of sacred history in our time. Fr Montuclard makes the same disputable point when he writes: 'it is obvious that the progress of the Church cannot be left to the mystics'. If the expression 'progress of the Church' is defined in terms of an adaptation to successive patterns of social organization, then indeed this is not the saints' affair: but such a definition is excessively superficial; it is on the plane of Marxist communism. In this conception, progress takes place essentially in the infrastructure of economics, and the Church can do no better than to follow suit. But that is not really history at all, as we have been trying to show. The real progress of the Church is the deliverance through baptism of souls in bondage, and the greater glory of God in the holy Eucharist: and the protagonists of this history are in truth the saints.

 



CHAPTER SEVEN


A BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION OF MODERN HISTORY

 

MUCH has been written in our time by philosophers and theologians about the interpretation of history. Their work is always subject to the suspicion that they may be twisting the facts to fit into the particular system which they favour. Professional historians tend to take all these large generalizations with a grain of salt. There is the germ of a conflict between the 'academic historians', concerned only to establish truths of fact, and scrupulously avoiding any kind of interpretation, and the theologians, who interpret the facts, perhaps without paying enough attention to the question whether they are fully established. For the resolution of this antinomy, we need the witness of a professional historian who will address his mind to the possibility of a valid interpretation of history: exactly as Professor Butterfield has done in his short but remarkable book on Christianity and History.

Butterfield is quite clear that 'academic history' is not self-sufficient; plainly, as he appreciates, there must be an interpretation. It is the merest hypocrisy to pretend to be writing 'pure' history. The simplest arrangement of facts presupposes an act of judgement. This does not mean that all historical writing is irremediably subjective: one can pass beyond the stage of mechanical enumeration without necessarily forsaking science in favour of prejudice. There are certain criteria of truth in 'academic history' to ensure the correctness of the record, and there are equally valid criteria for its interpretation. It remains to be seen what they are: but although they are obviously something other than the rules of historical criticism, they must be no less strict and of equally probative force.

The aim of Butterfield's book is to discover the principles of a right interpretation of history. He starts from an examination of the wrong interpretations. Considering the Protestant historical schools of fifty years ago, he observes with a certain friendly sharpness that 'the unanswerable Pope was some Professor -- a system more inconvenient than that of Rome, . . . because the seat of authority might change overnight and be transferred to a new teacher who had never been heard of before'.

The result is to encumber men's minds with a mass of preconceived ideas, wrongly mistaken for observed facts. Instead of seeing 'things as they really are', we tend to see them 'in the categories which historians have created . . . attributing things to the Renaissance when the Renaissance is a mere label that historians have chosen to apply to a generation of people'.

It is bad enough that any dogmatic system should be interposed between the minds of men and the reality of their experience, but the worst of it is that the systems actually distort our perceptions. Butterfield shows the frightening influence that particular notions of history can have in shaping men's minds -- a far more powerful and graver influence than that of the corresponding notions of physical science, because historical ideas have to do with human life and conduct. One danger of this sort is the tendency to regard the history of mankind as a prolongation of biological evolution, so that it is only the development of the human species that counts. 'This attitude is more understandable, more dangerous, and more likely to recur than many people realize.' Contrariwise, a first principle of interpretation will then be to preserve the distinction between history and the natural sciences, always considering humanity as a separate world.

The Marxist vision of history is another preconception, concerning which Butterfield's ideas are interestingly complex. He starts by acknowledging that there is a great deal of truth in the Marxist view of the importance of social conditions as a factor of human life. But he detects an illusion, common to all systems which presuppose a direct relationship between technical and moral progress, namely, the erroneous belief that living conditions modify the nature of man. This error arises from the correct observation that certain social forms do in fact produce a certain standard of conduct, called civilization. But these conventions are essentially nothing but mutual arrangements in restraint of selfinterest; they do not eliminate it. As soon as any crisis weakens or destroys the pattern of restraints, the natural barbarism emerges at once from behind the deceptive fagade of civilized manners.

No technical advance or social progress has any effect on human nature. 'No man has yet invented a form of political machinery which the ingenuity of the devil would not find a way of exploiting for evil ends.' Nothing is more dangerous than a failure to understand this truth: worst of all is the kind of optimistic idealism which persuades people of one culture that they are the privileged possessors of absolute social and ethical values, and thereby entitled to judge their inferior contemporaries in the light of this monopoly: 'situations become more frantic and deadlocks more hopeless because of man's universal presumption and self-righteousness'.

Hence follows another essential principle of historical interpretation, not to have faith in human nature. It is impossible to understand history unless you start from the conviction of universal sinfulness.

On this observation, which is the key to his book, Butterfield establishes a connexion between the two points of view, that of the pure historian and that of the biblical theologian. He shows that any really objective historian, honestly scrutinizing the record, must come to the conclusion that all the mistakes as well as all the crimes in history derive their origin from the sin of self-righteousnessi while the basic axiom of revelation, in the Bible, is that no man is righteous, but all men are sinners: this is the essence of the dogma of original sin. 'Though history does not carry these questions to the searching depths at which the theologian may make his judgements and expose the fallacy of our pretended righteousnesses, it seems to me that even at his own level, even in the realm of observable historical happenings, the historian must join hands with the theologian.'

The conclusion is plainly one of far-reaching importance. We are not dealing with an extraneous rule of interpretation, superimposed upon the results of historical reflection, deriving its validity from the private judgement of the individual critic. On the contrary, the historian himself, objectively inspecting his material, is compelled to this particular conclusion -- admittedly a negative conclusion, ruling out the possibility of any constructive theory of interpretation: but coinciding in this with the biblical view of reality. The ground-work of the prophetic message was similarly a denunciation of all human attempts to arrange history in the interests of mankind. The scepticism of the historian and the prophet's pessimism have a common origin: for the biblical interpretation of history is not simply a theological construct, not just another arguable theory, but a demonstration of the inadmissibility of any human theory of history, an absolute denial that history has any meaning or direction at all, other than mystical, and as may be divinely revealed.

The speculations of Christian theorists are no more valid than those of atheists. In his most interesting chapters, Butterfield discusses some of the ecclesiastical interpretations of history. Self-satisfaction is just as hypocritical among Christians as among communists. It is false to claim that the Church is responsible for social progress and enlightenment.

As a matter of fact, the working-class movement, led by communism, has achieved much more than the Church in the way of social justice (though that does not mean that communism is progressive). But then it is not the function of religion to save civilization, but to convince man of sin, and to teach him that it is only when he acknowledges his sinfulness that he can hope to be saved.

How does history look in the light of the dogma of original sin? When Butterfield has disposed of bogus ideologies, whether of Christian or non-Christian inspiration, he addresses himself to the constructive aspect of the case. It has never been easy for an observer of historical trends 'to see that morality itself was part of the structure of history, a thing as real and as drastic in its operation as the material strength of principalities and powers'. At first sight realpolitik seems to be universally triumphant, whether in the case of Napoleon, or of Bismarck (or, some would add, of Gladstone). But the very absurdity of this conclusion from outward appearances should indicate that we are looking for interpretations at the wrong level. We must recall to mind the mystical intuition of Isaiah: national triumphs in the realm of temporal affairs are no proof of the divine favour, as is falsely supposed in the dream of political messianism. These things only mean that God is using the nation as an instrument of his judgementsi; the instrument itself is expendable.

If anything is certain about the Christian view of economic and political values, it is that these are entirely relative. To treat them as absolute is a form of idolatry. The fundamental mistake in communism is the belief that communism is good and capitalism is evil; and the capitalist's mistake lies in holding the contrary belief. Collectivism and capitalism are both half-truths. If people understood this, they would not turn policies into ideologies; for there is no such thing as a mystique of politics: mysticism belongs to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It is the intrusion of mystical attitudes into political questions that leads to fanaticism, and to ideological wars, which are conflicts between false gods. The Christian's duty is to denounce these groupidols. There is no possibility of peace in the world until everyone recognizes that his own way is only a half-truth, so that instead of trying to exterminate other people, he must love them for their share in the truth.

If external prosperity affords no assurance of God's blessing, it must be extremely dangerous to derive moral satisfaction from the circumstance of temporal success. Selfabasement would be a more appropriate attitude. But the lesson must be taken further. The inward reality of history is not to be understood as consisting in an onward march of civilization, where particular nations or classes, successively co-operating in the general progress, assume in turn the role of providential agents. In actual fact 'every generation is equidistant from eternity'. The real purpose of history is to achieve -- through the mill of temporal vicissitudes -- 'the manufacture and education of human souls'. The real measure of history is not to be sought in the level of technical attainment, but in the more or less effective production of personalities, 'which represent the highest things we know in the mundane realm'.

From this point of view it becomes clear that historical disasters may be as richly productive as historical triumphs, and often more so. Once again, Butterfield recalls the history of Israel. He shows that it was 'amid disasters and predicaments more permanently hopeless than those of' any peoples of the present-day world, that 'the ancient Hebrews, by virtue of inner resources . . . turned their tragedy . . . into one of the half-dozen creative moments in world history'. In the days of their prosperity they were content with a grossly material conception of life; but in the period of their tribulation they found their way to a deeper stratum of human experience than man had ever sounded before, in the idea of the redemptive power of love, as it is unfolded in the Deutero-Isaiah. 'Only in a world where suffering is possible . . . can human beings measure the heights and depths of love and reach the finer music of life.'

In sum, the quality of an age is not determined by its material characteristics or by its ideological colour, but by its fruits of human and spiritual experience. What counts, in the end, is the response of personalities to circumstances; the circumstances themselves have neither value nor demerit of their own. Adversity is not itself a creative force, but it may call forth a response from the depth of men's souls, whereas prosperity is apt to leave men content with the surface of life as they find it.

This, then, represents the accumulated experience of a first-rate historian, which he has chosen to record for us after many years spent in the exploration of past time, and after discovering for himself the unreality of all the myths that obfuscate the various modern interpretations of history. The lesson of his experience is that a plain Christian man may understand more of the inwardness of history than highly-educated scholars whose vision is impeded by pretentious intellectual systems: 'Even in the study of history a kind of acquired simplicity is needed just to see things as they really are.' So seen, with the undisturbed clarity of the simple mind, the protagonists of visible history lose the prestige of their apparent importance, and take their rightful place in real history, which is the record of God's formation, in this world, of eternal souls destined for his kingdom. God makes use of those historic figures in the execution of his design, but they have no intrinsic value of their own: real history is not concerned with them. God made the world for his saints; it is through these, and on their account, that history, too, makes sense.

One of the key-words in Butterfield's book, highly expressive of its particular human and spiritual atmosphere, is 'judgement'. For one thing, the word sums up the mature, reflective wisdom of the experienced historian, who knows what he is talking about, and presents us with a true picture of the facts. That makes his book worth reading as an intellectual production. But the word also indicates a divine perspectivei for Judgement is the revelation of things as they are in God's sight -- that is, as they really are. In this light the pomps and vanities fade away, for all the brave show they make in human chronicles, and in their stead appear the things of real worth, the hidden glories of charity. This judgement is veiled from the eyes of the world, but it is discernible by faith. It is proclaimed in the Magnificat: 'He has put down the mighty from their seat, and exalted the lowly'. [87] Mary rejoices to see this, because it means putting things in their right place.

This is the Judgement that really illuminates human history; and the great merit of Butterfield's book is to have shown that history is meaningless without it. For those of us who are convinced that the most dangerous tendency of the modern world is the way in which bogus theories are given the force of dogma -- as that technical progress is good in itself, or that a particular class or nation has a messianic function -- for us, the book is like a gust of fresh air to clear away all these poisonous fogs. Seen through all the false, pretentious trappings of theory that it habitually claims to wear, here is the nakedness of history, and it is in the likeness of everlasting sin. Only so long as history acknowledges the truth of this likeness can it find its place in real history, the history of salvation.

Butterfield's interpretation is endorsed in a truly extraordinary fashion by the author of another book of the same period -- not an historian, this time, but a philosopher, starting from an entirely different position. [88] Mr Löwith's question is to ascertain whether historia, defined as research into the facts of human behaviour in the past, is reconcilable with the theology of sacred history: can we find in sacred history a valid interpretation of empirical history? It is a question that has exercised the minds of Christian thinkers for some two thousand years, and may be said to have remained unanswered: though it is true that some have tried to impose a 'providential' form on the succession of civilizations, in the shape of a tendency towards the evolution of a Christian civilization. Löwith pays particular attention to Bossuet, in this connexion; but it should not be forgotten that Eusebius of Caesarea had already developed the same theory when he characterized the imperium romanum as a providential preparation for the Constantinian monarchy. It may also be remarked that Toynbee, at the other end of the Christian era, arrives at a similar conclusion, by identifying Christianity as the latest form of civilization.

What is ordinarily called the philosophy of history derives its origin from this Christian conception of design in profane history. It begins with Voltaire's substitution of the idea of enlightenment for that of Providence; his interpretation amounts to a theory of indefinite progress in civilization. The supreme exponent of this optimistic philosophy was Condorcet, rightly appreciated by Löwith as a figure of primary importance. Hegel added a tough metaphysical framework to support the theory: history is rational throughout; mind directs it irrevocably towards fulfilment. Nothing but the restricted scope of our understanding prevents us from recognizing this logic in events. After Hegel, it only remained for Marx to provide a dialectic of economics, in order to present the theory as a rigorously scientific system.

But in fact this philosophy of history falls a long way short of the scientific precision claimed for it by such writers as Comte and Marx: for it has never succeeded in overcoming the basic difficulty that vitiated the 'providential' theory (from which it derives, through a process of secularization). It is still a hybrid between the positive analysis of facts, and a value-judgement, an act of faith. The act of faith has some foundation for those believers who can base it upon the word of God; but for the positivist, it is in the air. Thus the doctrine of progress, in the secular philosophy of history, is a pure myth. The only valid conception of history that can be derived from a factual study of events is Burckhardt's vision of man at odds with various sociological data, displaying his greatness by overcoming his environment. But this greatness is no less sublime in the age of Pericles than in the Napoleonic period. Empirical history affords no evidence of progress in the scale of human values.

If we turn to the 'providential' theory, this proves equally invalid. It has a solid basis, indeed, in the Word of God: but this word has to do with the things of faith. Attempts, like those of Eusebius and Bossuet, to interpret the history of the empires in the light of revelation, are thus necessarily misleading. Here Löwith's criticism coincides with Butterfield's. The growth of empires, economic change, social progress -- these things seem to be unrelated to the coming of the kingdom of God and the course of sacred history. The former have no effect upon the latter; and conversely, the effect of Christianity on civilization does not amount to any structural modification, but only (as Orosius saw in the fifth century) to such measures of reform as the ethical requirements of Christianity may necessitate.

Thus profane history and sacred history appear to be perfectly independent of each other; at all events we cannot establish any relationship between them. Our knowledge of them derives from two incommensurable sources, since profane history is known by research, historia in its ancient meaning, while sacred history is only known by faith. There is no common ground for a philosophy of history, whether religious or secular: 'More intelligent than the superior vision of philosophers and theologians is the common sense of the natural man and the uncommon sense of the Christian believer. Neither pretends to discern on the canvas of human history the purpose of God or of the historical process itself. They rather seek to set men free from the world's oppressive history by suggesting an attitude, either of skepticism or of faith.'

The conclusions of the philosopher Löwith are startlingly like those of the historian Butterfield. Both are in reaction against optimistic theories of progress, which Butterfield unanswerably convicts of pharisaism. Both are also in a most salutary reaction against the secularization of the biblical conception of history, as they plainly declare that the ultimate meaning of history is a matter of theological faith and not of empirical research. It is, no doubt, also true that they both go rather too far in the direction of pessimism when they make an impassable gulf between sacred and profane history. We should prefer to say that although the latter is meaningless in itself, it makes sense as part of the former. The history of peoples and minds all belongs to the universal picture in the mind of God. But it remains true to say that the relationship of human events to sacred history lies wholly in the field of mystery, and defies every attempt at formulation.

 


 

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS:

AND THE HISTORY OF SALVATION

ANY investigation of the great non-Christian religious systems -- Hindu, Mohammedan, Confucian -- forces the student to consider how these stand in regard to Christianity. In looking at this particular question, I am not now concerned directly with the content of the other religions themselves, or to expound the nature of the Christian religion, but to see what is the relation of the former to the latter. It is a problem of some contemporary importance. Books and periodicals everywhere abound for the dissemination of Indian, Islamic and Jewish literature; adherents of these great systems rub shoulders with us daily. Whether in books or in personal contacts, we are constantly impressed by the deeply religious quality of what we find. This can be, and often is, disturbing.

Tritheistic speculations, or the symbol of the cross, found in Indian traditions, invite us to think about the fundamental relationship between these things and the Christian dogma, or sign. We can hardly acknowledge the good we get out of reading a Buddhist or Mohammedan mystic without wondering about the distinctive character of Christian mysticism, recalling perhaps Simone Weil's provocative formula: 'In practice, mystics belonging to nearly all the religious traditions coincide to the extent that they can hardly be distinguished.' [89] ut granting all this, what becomes of the unique transcendence of Christianity? And if e are still sure of it, can we justify our conviction? First of all, what is it?

Here we have to avoid two errors. One is to regard all non-Christian religions as gross superstitions or aimless speculations. We must, on the contrary, fairly allow the genuine spiritual worth that is in them. Pius XII, in the encyclical Divini praecones, said that 'the Church has never despised pagan teaching, but rather freed it from its errors'. In Péguy's characteristic phrase, there is no need to run down Sévère in order to set up Polyeucte: we can appreciate Christianity without belittling other creeds -- in fact, it will only stand the higher for a due recognition of the stature of all that it surpasses.

But the opposite error is more harmful still. On every hand, among our contemporaries, we hear arguments tending to minimize the transcendent quality of Christianity, or denying it altogether -- obliterating the frontiers that mark its distinction from all other religions. Sometimes it is made out to be merely one element (and not even the most indispensable element) in a single stream of 'religious tradition'. Again, it is seen as a stage in the religious evolution of mankind, and as such doomed, maybe, to make room for others in the future. In another order of ideas, the suggestion is made that dogma is of secondary importance, and that it is possible in any religion to achieve the essential 'spiritual experience'. Or, pragmatically, we are advised to sink our domestic differences, and combine our 'spiritual energies' in the common struggle against the rise of materialism.

These are obviously unacceptable ideas. But they are all around us; they make a certain impression; we hardly know how to refute them. The problem, simply expressed, is this: given the real worth of the pagan religions, what exactly is the superiority of the Christian religion?

* * *

The first characteristic of Christianity is belief in an event, the resurrection of Christ, which represents an incursion of God's action into the historical process, a radical change in the conditions of human life, an absolutely new thing. Here is a fundamental difference from all other religions. This was what René Guénon missed, when he saw no more in Christianity than a particular form of the original religious tradition -- he left out just what is original in Christianity itself. The great non-Christian religions know of an eternal world over against the world of time; but they know nothing of an irruption of one into the other, giving substance and form to the flux of time, making it into history.

Greek thought furnishes examples, in the Platonic theory of ideas, and in the Stoic theory of eternal recurrence. But I am more concerned now with living religious systems. Mircéa Eliade has noted the 'revolt' of primitive religions 'against concrete, historical time, their nostalgia for a periodical return to the mythical time of the beginning of things'. [90] he aim of primitive ritual is to get away from the small change of common life into the single eternity of first things: it is the 'abolition of time through the imitation of archetypes and the repetition of paradigmatic gestures. A sacrifice, for example, not only exactly reproduces the initial sacrifice revealed by a god ab origine, at the beginning of time, it also takes place at that same primordial mythical moment.'

It follows from this view of things that no particular occurrence has any permanent reality, and that the historical process pays no dividends. Real value is only to be found in re-presentations; to quote Mircéa Eliade again: 'reality is acquired solely through repetition or participation: everything which lacks an exemplary model is "meaningless".' And this reality is achieved in and by the abrogation of normal, everyday time. 'No event is irreversible, and no transformation is final. In a certain sense, it is even possible to say that nothing new happens in the world.' The contrast is evident with the opposite, Christian idea of the particular occurrence of the Incarnation -- an irreversible fact, of supreme value, wholly a new thing.

In Indian religious thought, time is even further cheapened, though in another manner. The notion of time is highly developed, in the theory of yuga, or cosmic cycles, manifested in regular procession. But the appearance of progress is deceptive: the succession of yuga amounts in the end to destruction and renewal. If time is cyclical it is not irreversible -- we are back in the eternal recurrence, the myths of periodical destruction and creation. As Eliade has said elsewhere: 'seen against the higher Time, all being is precarious, insubstantial, illusory. History proves impermanent, not fully real. Ontologically, temporal existence is a kind of non-existence.'

So that here the aim will be not to revivify temporal existence, as in primitive rites, by returning to the beginning of time, but simply to escape from time itself. The whole technique of yoga is designed for this escape out of time, not only through a conviction that time is unreal, but positively through the practice of a timeless trance. Once more, there is a diametrical opposition between this and the content of Biblical revelation: for the prophets, time is neither unreal nor evil; it is the framework of God's plan, within which the body of Christ is built up. And, as will appear, this fundamental contrast involves a contradiction between the two corresponding ideas of contemplative ecstasy.

Islam is no different from the rest, which is the more extraordinary because of its Biblical tradition. Yet the fact is certain (and provides evidence of the regressive character of this religious system). Joachim Mubarak has shown, in an important article, that the basic idea of Islam consists in a primitive, or original, type of monotheism, constantly subject to corruptions, restored successively to its pristine purity by the three prophets, Abraham, Jesus, Mohammed. Here again the temporal process is mere debasement, there can be no valid aim but reversion to a perfect beginning. Hence what M. Massignon calls 'instantaneism': 'Mohammedan thought has no place for continuous duration, recognising only discrete moments of time (ânât)'.

There is a measure of truth in these notions of time. They represent for mankind, more or less faithfully through all the aberrations of paganism, one plane of reality, the plane of natural religion. The Epistle to the Romans acknowledges this measure of truth: 'men have caught sight of his invisible nature, his eternal power and his divineness, as they are known through his creatures.' [91] God is revealed in the alternation of seed-time and harvest, his witness shown to all nations, spoken of in the Acts of the Apostles. [92] In the natural order, we do believe in the inherent stability of things -- we cannot conceive an evolutionary transmutation of structures. Guénon is thus far right. But then Christianity establishes a different order.

Here we do indeed find something that is new, for God here breaks in upon history. Christianity is first and foremost an historical event, the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. Thus the substance of the Christian revelation is not in a knowledge of God's existence (which other religions have as well), but in the perception of his activity on the scene of time, his effective interventions in the world of human history. From the Creation to the Resurrection, by way of the choosing of our father Abraham, the Christian revelation is a sacred history, the chronicle of the wonderful works of God, a documentary narrative: alone among sacred books, the Christian's Bible is not a collection of doctrine but a story.

* * *

So much for our first point, that Christianity means belief in God's coming into the world as the man Christ Jesus.

Now we proceed to a second statement, namely that this divine act alone can save mankind; there is no salvation but in Jesus. This truth is contrary to another of the syncretistic notions we have been considering, the idea that all forms of mystical experience amount to the same thing: a broad view, which has its attractions for those who are repelled by the intransigent claims of Christianity. But if religious mystics are all alike, this means that salvation is brought about by the practice of detachment from creatures, and by the efforts of man to achieve union with God, rather than through the work of Christ's cross. Once again, we must recognize a fundamental contradiction.

To avoid possibilities of misunderstanding, let it be said plainly that we do not undervalue the instances of a truly interior life and spiritual detachment that are to be found among non-Christian religions. From China, we have received a wonderful rule of wisdom, in the teachings of Confucius, to govern the dealings of men with one another. India furnishes the example of a society attuned to the highest ideals of the ascetic and contemplative life: the masterpieces of Indian religious literature, from the Bhagavadgita to Aravinda, powerfully inculcate an impression of the vanity of earthly goods, and the supereminent values of the unseen world. In the West, at a time when the exploitation of natural resources absorbs men's whole attention, under the Marxist illusion that human nature can be changed by a variation in the material conditions of life, it is no wonder if the message of the Indian sages appeals to people whose souls are athirst for silence and recollection.

But these aspirations presuppose that it is possible for man to attain to God through his own efforts, which Christianity absolutely denies for two reasons. The first is the solid fact of original sin, cutting man off from God. Man cannot cancel this separation: he is imprisoned, he cannot get out by himself. It is of no use simply to say that men having taken the wrong road by pursuing outward appearances, need only turn away from corporal things in order to regain that life of pure spirituality which is their true life. In any case Christianity does not regard the body, or the world of matter, as the root of all evil. But the whole man, body and soul, is cut off from God, and God alone can set man free by grace from captivity.

And, secondly, our God is, absolutely, unattainable, so that he alone can confer upon man that participation in himself which we call supernatural life. If the soul is supposed to be essentially divine (as in fact it is, in the Hindu and in the neo-platonic theodicy), the mere elimination of extraneous obstacles is enough -- the soul finds God in awareness of self: but this does not follow if there is a radical distinction between the uncreated God and the spiritual creature. Indian mysticism is based on a kind of pantheism. The Christian profession of faith, on the other hand, begins with God the creator, that is, with the radical distinction between him and man. God alone can raise man up into that sharing in his own life which constitutes our supernatural existence and culminates in mystical union. It is unattainable by human effort.

From this position, several consequences flow, each of which emphasizes the singularity of the Christian religion -and first of all this: that salvation comes through faith in Christ Jesus our Saviour, not through works (as St Augustine triumphantly maintained against Pelagius). What a man must do to be saved is to acknowledge himself a sinner and open his heart to receive the grace of God. Thus humility is essential for salvation, and pride, particularly the pride of worldly wisdom, the chief impediment. Whereas from the syncretist point of view, all those who lead the interior life are saved, regardless of their religious affiliation, the Christian vision is exactly the opposite -- those who believe shall be saved, regardless of their progress in inwardness: an infant, or an overdriven labourer, given faith, can take precedence before heroes of asceticism. 'We are not great religious figures,' as Guardini excellently said, 'we are servants of the word.' Christ himself told us that there had been no greater man than St John the Baptist, 'but he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he'. There may be great religious figures outside Christianity -it may well be that the greatest religious figures are to be found outside Christianity -- but this is of no consequence: what matters is obedience to the word of Jesus Christ.

It is in the light of these considerations that we may see the difference between non-Christian mystics and Christian mysticism. For the former, union with God is the term of an ascetic process whereby the soul strips itself of all extraneous attachments, to find at last its own true being, which is God himself. The emphasis is on technique -recollection, singleness, etc. Christian mystics may make use of these methods; but then they are matters of secondary importance, and they cannot be effective in themselves: for our God is a living God, the all-highest, not to be encompassed by any technical proficiency. He grants his favours and himself to whom he will, freely and as he chooses. Mystical experience is not subject to the rules of method. Divine grace smote down Saul the persecutor on the road to Damascus, and flooded the soul of Marie de l'Incarnation as she worked among the wine-casks on a jetty by the Loire. The spring of grace is simply divine love, sovereignly free. To be ready to win it and receive it is not so much a matter of psychological training, as rather a religious disposition of the soul. Abdication of the will, conformity to God's good pleasure -- this is the language of all Christian mystics. Thus, too, it will be found that all mystical favours are independent of any typical patterns of the contemplative life, of outward silence and sensible recollection; they are compatible with the most exacting of apostolic labours. St Francis Xavier, storm-tossed in the ship that took him to Japan, was carried away by a torrent of heavenly consolations.

The same contrast can be described in another way, by saying that the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian religions is the difference between saints and heroes. The ascetic achievements of the Indian sages are admirable, indeed: they may be said to mark the limit of human possibility. But the saints are not like that. Humanly speaking they are often cowardly and weak, yet they undertake hard things, superhuman tasks, relying on the power of God. So it was with the early martyrs: so it was for Jean Brébeuf, who admitted he had not the courage to prick his own finger with a pin, and went to preach the Gospel to the Iroquois in the knowledge of hideous tortures awaiting him. This explains how a saint can remain personally humble in the performance of heroic deeds; and how martyrdom and sanctity constitute a proof of the divine origin of Christianity. If the evidential value of martyrdom consisted simply in proving that Christianity can inspire the highest kind of self-sacrifice, it would be reasonable to object that men have been willing to die for other causes, too. The real point is that martyrdom as such exhibits the power of God even in the absence of any exceptional human generosity. Heroism shows what man can do: holiness shows what can be done by God. Holiness is independent of all particular human characteristics. Holiness depends on faith alone.

Origen and St Augustine saw this clearly enough. They accepted martyrdom and sanctity as proving the pre-eminence of the Christian religion, because these facts demonstrated the working of a divine δúαμις in the world. It is St. Paul's formula for the Gospel: 'God's power (δúαμις), that brings salvation to all who believe in it, Jew first and then Greek'. [93] 'Our preaching to you did not depend upon mere argument; power was there (ν δúαμις), and the influence of the Holy Spirit.' [94] Thus we come back to the essential point of our argument: Christianity does not consist in the strivings of man after God, but in the power of God, accomplishing in man that which is beyond the power of man; human efforts are merely the response called forth by the divine initiative. This, then, is the second mark of the unique transcendence of Christianity.

* * *

So far we have been mainly concerned to point out how the Christian religion is characterized as an immediate act of God. Its transcendent quality is equally visible in the content of dogma, despite that third group of syncretist theories, claiming to trace in other religions the outlines of the chief tenets of Christianity (the Trinity, the Redemption, and so on). There is in fact a certain number of these parallels. They have been shown, over and over again, to be quite superficial; no instructed person can really take them seriously: but they have enjoyed a wide publicity, and still serve to introduce into people's minds a kind of ambiguity, debilitating the force of conviction. To this extent they deserve consideration. As it happens, Simone Weil made a collection of these talking points in her Letter to a Priest. It is extraordinary that anyone with such powers of penetration as she showed in other contexts should be so uncritical; but her example could easily be enough to resurrect this theme. Her text may therefore serve as our starting-point.

She relates Christ's words 'I am the true vine' to the Dionysiac cult of the fruit of the vine. These are, as is well known, two different ideas: one, Palestinian, of the vine symbolizing the chosen people ( Isa. 5: 1); the other, Greek, of the vine symbolizing immortality, through the notion of drunkenness. She finds parallels for the motherhood of the Blessed Virgin in the various mother-goddesses of antiquity; but it is matter of proof that the Christian worship of our Lady derives from the fact of her share in the historical process of human salvation, and not from any sublimation of womanhood, comparable with the development of nature-cults. Again, Christ's death upon the cross is related to the crucifixion of the world-soul in the Timaeus, whereas, obviously, the Christian cross derives from the instrument of our Saviour's passion, which was T-shaped -and not from the multidimensional symbolism of other religious systems.

Simone Weil quotes the Greek and Hindu triads in parallel with the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity -but this teaching has plainly nothing in common with any dialectical process, it is rather in direct conflict with human reason; our God is not revealed as primal unity in separate manifestations, but as three Persons subsisting eternally in one Nature. 'St John,' she says, 'in making use of the words Logos and Pneuma, indicated the profound relationship between Greek stoicism . . . and Christianity.' But there is conclusive proof that the Johannine λóγος is the Hebrew dabar -- the word as creative of what is spoken: it has no point of connexion with the Stoics' λóγος, 'reason'. And πυευ+̑μα in the New Testament is the Biblical rouah, the image of God in a strong gale of wind -- not the common Greek πυευ+̑μα, 'a breath', the figure of incorporeity.

The formulae of Christian liturgy are often borrowed from the rites of natural religions. Thus in the third century, Hippolytus of Rome develops the cosmic symbolism of the cross. [95] From the fourth century onwards, the terminology of the pagan mysteries is used in connexion with the sacraments. In the catacombs the vine symbolizes immortality. Within the last few years, Abbot Monchanin has proposed the use of the term saccidananda, which denotes the Hindu triad, for the mystery of the Holy Trinity.[96] All these developments are secondary, matters of cultural acclimatization. Christian dogma starts by being a new thing.

This is not to deny that natural religion possesses a measure of God's truth -- we have already seen that it does, and that 'from the foundations of the world', as St Paul tells us, 'the invisible nature' of God is 'known through his creatures'. Before Abraham was, 'God left us some proof of what he is', men could learn in some degree what to expect of him, and something of his infinite perfection. But that was all. The non-Christian religions, then, could arrive at such knowledge as it is in the power of unaided human reason to attain -- the knowledge of God ab extra, of his existence, and of his perfections in so far as these are made manifest through his activity in the world.

But beyond the reach of all human reason there is something else, an inaccessible threshold, an impenetrable cloud, the secret of God's private life: the inscrutable mysteries of the Holy Trinity; which no man can fathom, which could be revealed only by the Son of God. In the words of St John: 'No man has ever seen God; but now his onlybegotten Son, who abides in the bosom of the Father, has himself become our interpreter.' [97] This is the heart and core of the irreducible originality of Christianity, that the Son of God came among us to reveal these two intimately related truths: that there is within God himself a mysterious living love, called the Trinity of Persons; and that in and through the Son we men are called to share this life of love. The mystery of the Holy Trinity, known to us through the Word made flesh, and the mystery of the deification of man in him -- that is the whole of our religion, summed up in one person, the person of Jesus Christ, God made man, in whom is everything we need to know. Here we put our finger on the essential distinction, the specific element of Christianity, the ultimate reason of its unique transcendence: it is Jesus Christ, son of God, our saviour. The religions of nature bear witness (and this is the measure of their real worth) to the natural tendency of man towards God: Christianity is God's approach towards man in Jesus Christ, taking possession of man to bring him to himself.

The reality of the Biblical revelation being radically different from the content of the other religions, the former cannot be regarded simply as one form, even as the supreme form, of the natural religious instinct. Nevertheless, as we have before insisted, the nature-religions are not destitute of positive values. They represent an authentic manifestation of true religion, the representation of God through the regular procession of cosmic events, corresponding to the covenant with Noah. But when a new and better covenant was made, the former covenant was superseded. And not only so, but the religion of nature is invariably found, in the several non-Christian religious systems in which it exists as a matter of historical fact, to be more or less corrupt. This was St Augustine's point when he deplored the example of Socrates, the very model of the pre-Christian sage, who came so near the Truth, and yet asked that a cock should be sacrificed to Aesculapius before he died.

Are we at all concerned in these survivals of a former dispensation? They enshrine something of absolute worth, the relics of a primitive revelation: would it be no loss if they were to disappear altogether? Simone Weil felt this anxiety: 'were these other traditions to disappear from the face of the earth, it would be an irreparable loss. The missionaries have already made far too many of them disappear as it is.' Notwithstanding the finality of the revelation of Jesus Christ, our understanding of this revelation is progressive, and can be furthered by these other categories of insight. In his encyclical, Divini praecones, Pius XII gave an exact definition of the Catholic position in this matter (in a sentence which we have already quoted in part), and of the respect that is due to the genuine worth of the natural religions: 'The Church has never despised pagan teaching, but rather freed it from its errors, perfecting and crowning it in the light of Christian wisdom.'

It is to be observed that the Bible itself affords instances of this method. The chosen people lived in a world of other religions, rich in myths and cults of their own; rejecting these inadequate and faulty Gentile creeds, the Hebrews nevertheless constantly borrowed from them. The authors of the first chapters of Genesis controverted the very Babylonian or Canaanitish nature-myths, from which they derived their own patterns of representation. The Mosaic liturgical practices reflect the rites of Egypt under the Pharaohs. The apocalyptic writers took over much of their eschatology and angelic lore from Persia, but assimilated it into their own notion of history.

The Sapiential books are especially characteristic from this point of view. Throughout the Near East, in both Semitic and Greek-speaking lands, there was an immemorial tradition of sages, giving utterance to the wisdom of popular experience. There is mention of one Daniel, in a passage of Ezekiel: the excavations at Ras Shamra reveal this personage as a Canaanitish sage, the typical 'wise man' of a people that inhabited Palestine before the Jews. Arikah, who appears in the book of Tobit, has been identified as a sage of Babylon. Job was an Edomite, but the Scripture puts into his mouth some of its sublimest teaching. The Egyptian Amem-em-ope offers many parallels to the Book of Proverbs. Greece had her Seven Sages.

The Biblical revelation brought with it a new and better wisdom: as the Third Book of Kings has it, 'Wisdom, too, God gave to Solomon . . . For that, no king of the east or of Egypt could vie with him, of all men the wisest; wiser than Ethan the Ezrahite, or Heman, or Chalcol, or Dorda, that were sons of Mahol'. [98] Christ was to teach a yet more perfect wisdom, which to the wisdom of men would seem folly: 'a greater than Solomon is here'. [99] But the utterances of the rabbi of Nazareth, no less than the Sapiential books, will be found to preserve the best of the wisdom of the Gentiles, re-animated with a new inspiration. So the Church in her turn 'does not despise pagan teaching, but sets it free, fulfils and crowns it'.

This formula contains an excellent summary of the Christian position. The spiritual values contained in the pagan religions are not under-estimated; but they need, in the first place, to be purged of error and corruptions, especially idolatry. Conversion therefore always involves an abjuration -- there is no gradual evolution from paganism into Christianity. And secondly, Christianity perfects and fulfils, in the light of Christian wisdom, the incomplete truths that are to be found in paganism. It takes over the religious capital of the natural man, and sanctifies it. In the first ages of Christianity, the riches of Greek philosophy were thus purged and assimilated. It may be that in future years Christianity will similarly cleanse and incorporate the treasures of Hindu asceticism and the wisdom of Confucius. The mission of Christianity, rightly understood, involves no destruction of pagan religious values, but liberation and transfiguration. Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil.

 


 

CHAPTER NINE

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF RENÉ GUÉNON

 

THE work of René Guénon, who died in 1949, was surely among the most original productions of our time. It stands so completely outside the boundaries of modern thought, and is so sharply at variance with the most inveterate habits of the modern mind, as to seem like a foreign body in the intellectual world of the present day. But then the strength of Guénon's position was this absolute independence of all contemporary prejudice, and the austere discipline of mental solitude in which he worked. By common consent, his subject-matter included the most critical problems of the age: technological civilization and its inherent dangers, and the whole question of the economic and political organization of society. His treatment of these topics was penetrating, disturbing: he cannot be ignored. There was truth in much that he had to say, but there were short-comings which made his position untenable for a Christian.

A first service to truth was his rehabilitation of symbolic understanding in opposition to scientific epistemology. This was perhaps his most violent departure from modern habits of thought. For men trained in the methods of the exact sciences, as chemistry or astronomy, any idea of a return to alchemy and astrology is a monstrous absurdity. Guénon held, on the contrary, that the whole direction of modern thought was hugely astray: he found more of the substance of truth in the childish fancies of the astrologers than in all the technical achievements of scientific astronomy. The two things are not on the same plane. Science enlarges the dimensions of the cage in which the mind of man is imprisoned, but all the science in the world will not get him out of it. But in the intuitive perception of symbolism, the mind reaches out from material reality to grasp another reality beyond: this is an enlargement of the spirit.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be said that Guénon was not concerned to re-establish the popular pseudoscientific conceptions of astrology and alchemy. His point was that mankind's interest in stars, or metals, as symbols lies deeper than any consideration of their mechanical utility or of their physical structure. In a lovely passage of his Roi du Monde, he tells of the emerald that fell from Lucifer's brow, the stone from which the Holy Grail was cut. An emerald has a certain commercial value, which is what interests the jeweller, or the rich man who keeps the gem in his safe. Again, it has certain physical properties and characteristics which concern the student of inorganic chemistry. But what really matters about an emerald is its colour and its hardness; and these are what the alchemist cares for.

It is the same in other departments of knowledge. Thus astronomy teaches us the mechanics of the heavenly bodies; but this is a superficial knowledge. The stars are full of meaning, which is much more important. Guénon knew well enough that there could be no question of regarding the stellar motions as determinants of sublunary events; their significance would be rather as symbols of a higher order of reality. Here we are reminded of Mircéa Eliade, who has shown that the devotees of astral cults do not in fact worship the stars themselves, but a spiritual reality which is made known through the hierophany of the visible heavens. This is obviously poles apart from the conceptions of popular astrology, according to which the stars exert an influence on human life.

The same critical principles are applicable to geometry and the science of numbers. Geometrical figures are of interest, apart from their mathematical properties, for qualitative reasons; they are the basis of all pictorial symbolism. Guénon was particularly concerned, in this connexion, with the form of the cross, as we shall shortly see. Arithmetic is in the same position as geometry, for there is a symbolism, as well as a science, of numbers. Guénon pointed out that the special importance of the numbers seven and forty in the Bible is not fortuitous; they are part of a significant language; and this not merely by an arbitrary convention, but because of the intrinsic qualities of the numbers themselves, just as in the case of the figures of Euclid and the constellations.

For it must not be overlooked that the symbols found in the various racial and cultural traditions are identical, or at least similar. It will hardly be admissible to explain this phenomenon by the hypothesis of unbroken tradition from a common sources though Guénon, in some of his less satisfactory passages, seems to have inclined towards such an explanation. Mircéa Eliade seems to be on much surer ground in attributing the fact to the intrinsic characteristics of the symbol-objects themselves on the one hand, and those of human intelligence on the other: the mind of man is so constituted that it will always spontaneously find the same symbols in the same objects. On this hypothesis there is bound to be a natural, universal pattern of symbolism, such as actually appears in the historical traditions. That does not mean that the pattern is invariable, for symbols have a life of their own in the group-mind, which is as yet largely an uncharted sea.

Guénon sees Christian symbolism as an element in the universal tradition. He compares the significance of the cross in the Hindu and the Christian systems. He notes the number of the twelve apostles, as a parallel for the twelve signs of the Zodiac. The Pope's white cassock is part of the evidence for the special regard paid in all religious systems to the colour white. Undoubtedly there are analogies between Christian and other symbols: Guénon proceeds from this point to conclude that Christianity is one manifestation of the primordial human religious tradition, and consequently to restrict his attention to that which Christianity has in common with other religions. Here we begin to part company with him.

Of course Christianity recognizes the existence of an authentic natural symbolism, which belongs to natural religion, and to the revelation of God to all mankind through the world of creation, which we have already discussed. But Christianity itself is just not that at all: it is something else, something entirely new, an invasion of history by the creator of the world. The cross is important in Christianity, not primarily because of its symbolic qualities, but because Christ was put to death on a particular kind of wooden gibbet. The historical event came first; it was later that liturgical development, seizing upon the approximately cruciform shape of this instrument, enriched it with all the natural symbolism of the cross, the figure of the four dimensions, or of the four cardinal points, illustrating the universal value of Christ's redemptive suffering. This is all secondary, in comparison with the historical facts.

Guénon completely failed to appreciate the special position of Christianity as the religion of a new thing: and it is no wonder, for a wholesale repudiation of history was one element in his system. This is the second aspect of his work that we have to consider. Here again we find a strange mixture of admirable and worthless material. Taking the best first, he is profoundly satisfactory in the unparalleled vigour with which he castigated modern ideas of progress and evolution, or historicism. Not content with the belief, which we share, that it is absurd to look to scientific developments for a qualitative transformation of human nature, Guénon went further: he insisted that this folly is symptomatic of a decadence which has been progressively marked since the sixteenth century. This raises a serious question. Ought we to conclude that science itself, not only the criminal abuse of science, but the whole tendency of science to usurp the due prerogatives of human wisdom, is bound to involve the world in catastrophe? Guénon's opinion may be thought too drastic, but the question admits of no simple optimistic answer.

We must not underestimate the full force of Guénon's courageous assault on some of the most deep-rooted and pernicious of modern prejudices. It is the fact that, by looking to science for salvation, mankind inevitably turns away from the true saviour; and all those who foster this delusion, be they Marxists or liberals, incur responsibility for the unhappy state of the world today. It is unquestionably true that the conceptions of scientific development and of biological evolution have no relevance for the life of the spirit. It is equally true that an exaggerated and exclusive preference for the methods of the experimental sciences tends to disqualify our contemporaries for the intellectual exercise of philosophical judgement. And it is true that, in the order of nature, the lapse of time affords no substantial increment of human values, for substantial values belong to the timeless world of metaphysical reality.

In the order of nature there is no real innovation. But this rule does not hold good for Christianity, which consists of a series of events effectively transforming the life of man in a perfectly new way. The most superficial inspection of the writings of St Paul cannot fail to reveal his preoccupation with novelty, the new creation, the new man. This points to the existence of something that was not to be found in the earlier tradition, a positive advance, a step forward -corresponding exactly to the transition from a knowledge of God through his visible creation to the new intimate revelation of the divine nature in Jesus Christ. With this new thing, this actual qualitative change, we find that which alone fully deserves the appellation of history. Guénon had no idea of it. He never admitted that Christianity was in a privileged position, as indeed he showed plainly enough by turning Mohammedan before he died.

These considerations lead towards a third and last aspect of Guénon's work, dealing with the inter-relation of science, wisdom and faith. In this field, as elsewhere, the author's positive contribution is what first claims our attention. In despite of relativity and pragmatism, Guénon insisted upon the primacy of the speculative intelligence, both in the temporal and in the eternal orders. The highest reality is in the world of incorruptible Ideas, whereof material things are only a transient reflection: so the highest activity of man is in the understanding of these essential principles. Thus Guénon reproduces the Platonic theory of contemplation. Then, secondly, it is only through the knowledge of eternal truth that human affairs can be wisely regulated; the possessors of such knowledge constitute Authority in the spiritual sphere. So Guénon, by restoring the basis of an hierarchical society, offended against another modern dogma, namely the universal law of democracy and manhood suffrage. Spiritual authority derives from the guardians of tradition. It belongs in an eminent degree, archetypically, to the roi du monde. It is visibly embodied in certain human characters, one of whom is the Pope. Hence Guénon's championship of the authoritarian aspect of Catholicism, contrasting with his denigration of Protestantism as a perversion of true Christianity.

Authority consists in the trusteeship of tradition; and the tradition in question consists of intellectual principles, primarily those of the Hindu philosophy, in the Vedanta, which was the subject of Guénon's first book. This is rather a dubious position, even from a narrowly philosophical point of view, for the Hindu philosophy is notably inadequate in such essential chapters as the transcendence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the creation. What is worse is the very postulation of philosophical truth as a supreme reality: while religion, and particularly the monotheistic tradition of the Mediterranean basin, is presented as a compromise between pure metaphysical principles and the affective demands of human nature, which require mystical and liturgical satisfactions. This inversion of the relationship between metaphysics and revelation is the great weakness, the fundamental flaw in Guénon's work.

Here is the point of insertion of the theory of esoterism, which occupies an important position in the system. Esoterism may mean either of two entirely different things. Within a single religion, there may be a group of doctrines which are held to be too mysterious for indiscriminate promulgation, especially to neophytes: for instance, in the case of Judaism, such matters as the interpretation of the Song of Songs; or, in the case of Christianity, the teachings of mystical theology. There is no difference in kind between the content of these esoteric doctrines and the substantial truths of religion, but only in degrees of spiritual penetration. Thus, for St Paul, gnosis -- knowledge -- is the unilinear continuation of faith. Nothing could be more repugnant to the ethos of Christianity than a segregation of first- and second-class Christians. The sacrament of baptism is sufficient once for all; the regenerate need no second initiation into the ritual and dogmatic mysteries.

The other meaning of esoterism, which was Guénon's, implies the existence of a secret body of doctrine behind and beyond the varieties of organized religion, but intrinsically common to them all, and attainable through a distinct initiatory process. Such were the gnostic heresies of the first centuries of Christianity. In this conception, the common people and the initiates have actually differing objects of faith or knowledge. The content of the secret doctrines is something other than the public teaching, something that is not Christianity at all as understood in the catechism. Defined dogma may be a symbolic representation of this esoteric doctrine, but the true hidden meaning of the doctrine is known only to the initiates. And in Guénon's system, the relation of exoteric to esoteric teaching corresponds exactly with the relation of religion to philosophic wisdom -- the wisdom that alone affords salvation.

It is obvious by now why Guénon's work is at once so important, and so disappointing. He compels attention by concerning himself with things that are really interesting in themselves, and by his bold denunciation of fallacies that seem to us, as they seemed to him, to be ultimately responsible for the decadence of the modern world. But his constructive system proves, upon examination, to be fundamentally incompatible with Christianity; for he has eliminated the very substance of our religion, in denying the privileged status, the absolute factual unicity of the event of Christ's resurrection.

 


 

CHAPTER TEN

SYMBOLISM AND HISTORY

 

IT is a fact of experience that symbols have an important function in all religious life and thinking. Theological expression draws largely, in the normal course, upon images taken from sensory perception, in order to deal with spiritual realities: this is equally true of Biblical theology, and of the theology of the sacraments, as of mystical theology. Yet we have to recognize that there is something disturbing, for the modern mind, in this mode of intellectual activity. People conditioned to think in terms of efficient causes are inclined to feel that the notion of exemplary causality must imply a lower standard of comprehension, better suited, perhaps, to poetry than to scientific knowledge, and falling short, at all events, of the strict criteria needed for full conviction. This line of criticism must be taken seriously, for it involves a kind of rebellion against the symbolical element in all theological teaching.

It is a comparatively recent aberration, and one with which the theologians of former times had not to reckon. Even apart from scriptural texts, which are obviously full of symbolism, patristic and medieval theology clearly made generous use of symbols: the de Divinis nominibus of the pseudo-Dionysius, which belongs in a sense to both periods, is a kind of Summa of symbolism, resuming from this point of view the teaching of the Fathers and preparing that of the scholastics. It is our intention in the present chapter to show that this symbolic theology is not to be regarded as a survival from a supposed 'pre-logical' phase of mental development, and thus as something of purely archaeological interest, but on the contrary as a permanently valid category of religious thought.

Let us first consider the facts. The use of visual images to represent the realities of religion is universal throughout the Jewish and Christian traditions. Already in the first verses of Genesis the creative power of God is likened to a great bird hovering over the surface of the waters, eliciting the first stirrings of life: this was, no doubt, the picture that first prompted the image, in the New Testament, of the dove descending over the river Jordan, as the Holy Ghost elicited the first-fruits of the new creation. Again in the closing chapters of the Bible, St John describes the new creation in terms of cosmic symbolism: there will be no need of the sun, 'for the Lord God will shed his light on them' [100] and 'no more sea', [101] for this represents the kingdom of death, and the habitation of the Dragon.

The Christian liturgy has taken over these images. At Christmas, after the winter solstice, when the days begin to lengthen once more, the Church celebrates the nativity of Christ as the eternally rising sun of the new world, of whom the prophet Zacharias said 'Here is one takes his name from the Dayspring'. [102] The new fire kindled in the Paschal vigil symbolizes that column of fire by which the Jews were guided in their wanderings in the desert, as it was said: 'He who follows me can never walk in darkness.' [103] The sacramental rite of baptism, immersion in the font, recalls the symbolism of water in the Bible; it is a going down into the deep waters of death, where Christ went down before us, to accomplish the baptism he had to be baptized with. [104] A whole corpus of 'death and resurrection' symbolism surrounds the theme of water, from the Creation to the Last Judgement, through the Flood, and the Atonement, and the laver of regeneration.

Granted the facts, what is the real importance of all this?

A system of imagery which is authorized by the whole scriptural and liturgical tradition can certainly claim the tribute of reverence; but is it anything more than an incrustation, a patina of antiquity? The cosmic symbols in question are clearly derived from obsolete general notions of astronomy and physics. The theme of the 'waters of death' belongs to an ancient Eastern belief in 'the waters under the earth'; what meaning can it have for us today? It was already superseded to some extent when Christian thought first accepted Hellenic influences, the maleficence of water being associated no longer with the Semitic idea of the dragon, but with the idea of the turbulent passions of men.

The difficulty is not to be lightly dismissed. Can we establish that certain material things are by their very nature intrinsically and distinctly appropriate to 'signify' or symbolize this or that? or does the quality of 'sign' depend in each case upon a positive attribution, extrinsically relating one thing to another? In the latter case it is clear that symbols would have little or no cognitional value. In their illustrative function, they would have a certain significance derived solely from the meaningful reality which they serve to indicate, but no distinct significance of their own at all. The question being generally regarded as open, the value of symbols, as a means of knowledge, is consequently discounted: they are felt to be too imprecise and uncertain to be trustworthy.

Admittedly, symbols are always liable to exhibit in fact a multiplicity of signification. Night, for instance, can symbolize the world of death and evil, as well as the idea of transcendence. The ocean is an image of destructive, as well as creative, power. Hence the variation of symbolic representations in different cultural traditions. The multivalence of symbols at least serves to elevate the technique of symbolic interpretation above the level of elementary algebra: and it must be remembered that such variations as there are take place within definite limits. The range of meanings is not unrestricted, for every actual instance of symbolic representation is always related in some way to the natural qualities of the symbol. But it remains to be seen whether this relationship can be more exactly defined.

The comparative history of religions furnishes valuable evidence for the pursuit of such an inquiry, for it shows that identical patterns of symbolic imagery recur universally. Thus we find the sun representing creative power both in ancient Greece and among the American primitives; and the same symbolism in Christianity. Similarly the theme of destruction by water, the theme of the Flood, is found in African religions, in the ancient Babylonian religion, and the Old Testament. I am not now concerned with the qualitatively different acceptation of these symbols in the pagan, and in the revealed, religions. The immediate point to be noted is the identity of representative methods, which does not, of course, imply an identity of real content.

These parallels might be explicable as due to the influence of one system or another. Comparative religion has notoriously overworked this hypothesis: every traceable analogy between the Bible -- in particular -- and ancient Eastern religious traditions, or between Christianity and the pagan mystery-religions, has been attributed to an 'influence'. Unquestionably there may have been such direct influences in points of detail: but the theory simply will not bear the weight of the facts to be explained. Another school would interpret the worldwide conformity of symbolic representations as vestigial evidence of a single primitive tradition, more or less imperfectly preserved and corrupt. On this view the various Flood-narratives would represent the tradition of an historical event that must have taken place before the separation of men into distinct races.

All such explanations are quite inadequate. The only acceptable conclusion is that the existence of a common set of symbols in the various religions is due to the parallelism of mental processes; but this means that the objective reality of the symbols themselves must be common ground as well. The argument is set out in Mircéa Eliade Traité de l'histoire des religions. Owing to the immense collection of historical data, it has become possible to relate patterns of ideas to groups of symbols. We find that the sky is always linked to the notion of divine transcendence; meteorological phenomena reveal God's power to create and to destroy; water symbolizes death and fertility; the moon is also connected with death and with life; trees support a congeries of interpretations -- the axis of the world, tree of life, ladder of heaven.

On this foundation it is possible to construct a positive science of religious symbolism, because we are no longer restricted to a single culture, or theorizing in a vacuum, but handling observed facts, and over the widest field. A scientific method takes into account both the flexibility of symbols in actual use, and also the fundamental constants which represent an objective correlation of image and idea. The same method reveals a tendency for symbols to be associated together in groups, which recur in widely separated contexts; as for instance the moon, the serpent, and water: patterns of correspondence and assimilation, arising from mysterious affinities.

It is significant that the results of these historical researches are paralleled by the independent work of certain psychologists, notably Jung, and the colleagues of Fr Hugo Rahner in the Eranos Yearbooks. In Jung's view, pagan myths are not simply an indication of primitive mentality, but represent one of the permanent manifestations of the life of mind. They make up the world of archetypes, that is, the background of all psychic activity: they are the expression of the deepest psychological reality, below the level of consciousness; they belong to the structure of soul itself. The significance of the archetypes being thus necessarily inexhaustible, it follows that the use of archetypal symbolism in liturgy and theology provokes an intuitive response in the soul.

Whether by way of analysis of concrete symbols in actual religious systems, or by way of the analysis of the subjective function of myth in subconscious psychology, we are thus brought to the same conclusion, namely that symbols have a constant significance. Symbolism proves to be a definite, characteristic psychological attitude: it is substantially the effort of mind to extract the intelligible meaning contained within physical reality. This is not something purely subjective; the mind does not merely project its own pattern upon the world of things, but discovers a real content through the symbolic appearance: that which is revealed is from without.

The question remains, what is this reality which is known through symbols? Many writers would maintain that nature-symbolism refers only to a simple representation of nature itself in terms of archetypes, or to a primitive conception of nature. On this hypothesis, myths are a sublimation of the laws of biology, a picturesque formulation of the cyclical movement of the universe: symbolic ritual, so understood, has the function of perpetually renewing the actual life of every day by keeping mankind in touch with the rhythm of physical existence -- the classical theory of nature-myths and its counterpart in psycho-analysis both point towards this conclusion. If it is sound, there can be no such thing as a cognitional value of myths: the mythical or symbolical interpretation of reality would still be an alternative to scientific method, but would offer no escape from the phenomenal world.

But in fact these theories fail to take account of the real significance of symbols, whose function is to afford us access through the visible world into a higher, transcendent plane of being. Rudolf Otto rightly observed that there are particular symbols, such as the boundless desert or the unfathomable night, whose echoes in the mind are specifically 'numinous', and irreducible to other types of experience. Mircéa Eliade has made masterly use of the same idea: he calls each of these individual phenomena an hierophany, a manifestation of the holy, so that one aspect or another of the divine being and activity is revealed in all of them -power in the storm, constancy in the circling of the stars, inexhaustible productive wealth in the rain and the sunshine. That theory of nature-myths is at fault which would make of human symbolism nothing but a sublimation of created biology. That which is revealed to us through these symbols is something authentically divine.

There is an objective validity in religious symbolism which is rooted in the real nature of things. The difficulty we find in accepting the fact comes from a mental distortion which we suffer through paying attention too exclusively to causal relations and too little to relationships of type, idea or exemplar. Symbolism is no survival from a past, pre-logical mentality of man, but depends on the functioning of laws which never cease to govern the realities of mind and of nature. It is directed towards the discovery of analogies between the visible and the invisible worlds, and towards the formulation of their meaning. It is a genuine mode of apprehension of the things of God.

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We have so far been concerned with religious symbolism in the abstract, as one distinct phenomenon, and have deliberately left aside the question of the various uses to which it is put, being thus enabled to consider under a single heading both Christian symbols and those of the non-Christian religions, myths as well as revelation; for there is in reality a measure of common ground in these two different things. On the other hand, the diversity between them is profound. In real life, there is no such thing as pure, undifferentiated symbolism, there are only historically attested particular systems of symbolism, exhibiting all kinds of transmutations and deformations. Our next task will be to examine these concrete historical situations, and to see the ways in which symbolism is employed in various religious contexts: more especially, we shall have to inquire what becomes of naturesymbolism in the case of the Christian revelation.

It has been established that religious symbolism is essentially a revelation of the divine through the things of the visible creation. This means that it belongs to the field of natural religion, to that religious capital, the patrimony of the human race, which is inexhaustibly exploited among all the perversions of paganism both before and since the coming of Christ. Nature-religions, as a class, are identified by this characteristic, namely, that they arrive at a certain knowledge of God through his creative activity and his providence, manifest in the visible work of his hands, while ignoring the fact of his interventions in the historical process -- as to which there is no witness before Abraham. It follows that natural religion, so understood, is the appropriate field of application and development of religious symbolism.

Yet, as we have said, the continuity of a thread of natural truth in the religious order throughout all the varieties of paganism is everywhere distorted by unnatural deviations. St Paul expressed the matter exactly in his Epistle to the Romans: 'although they had the knowledge of God, they did not honour him or give thanks to him as God; they became fantastic in their notions. . . and exchanged the glory of the imperishable God for representations of perishable man, of bird and beast and reptile.' [105] It was possible for men to come through the visible creation to some knowledge of the invisible God, but in practice they have not been able to discern him; instead of worshipping him as he is revealed through the significant aspects of his universe, they debased their adoration by devoting it to these created signs themselves, in cults of the sun and of the moon, of animals, or of the dead. It is this debasement of hierophanies into idolatry that constitutes the specific essence of paganism: a debasement of the natural revelation, of the first Covenant, into the characteristic form of myth.

The distinctive feature of a religious nature-myth, from this point of view, is that an hierophany is thereby frustrated; instead of leading up to an analogical apprehension of the transcendent Godhead, the process is arrested at the level of biological significance, and results in a mere ideal